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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78A-3-102 of the 
Utah Code. By Order dated October 31, 2008, this Court vacated a prior pour-over to the 
court of appeals and elected to retain this case on its docket. (R. 1278.) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Utah does not recognize a cause of action for "spoliation" as an 
independent tort. The Hills alleged in their Complaint that Liberty Mutual had spoliated 
evidence and sought damages for the alleged spoliation. Did the trial court correctly 
dismiss the Hills' Complaint for failure to state a claim under which relief could be 
granted? 
2. The Hills did not state a claim for spoliation, even under the tests created by 
the few jurisdictions that recognize spoliation as a cause of action, because they alleged 
only that Liberty Mutual had "hindered" their case against Skyline. The Hills' allegations 
also did not satisfy the elements of a traditional negligence analysis. Did the trial court 
correctly dismiss the Hills' Complaint for failure to state a claim under which relief could 
be granted? 
3. The Hills failed to state a claim for an intentional interference tort. The 
majority of the Hills' arguments relate to spoliation; however, even under an intentional 
interference tort, the Hills' complaint failed to present or preserve a claim under which 
relief could be granted. 
2 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is the same for all issues presented. 
Whether the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Stokes 
v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94,1J6, 987 P.2d 602. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural History 
This is an appeal of two orders entered by the trial court, one on June 12, 2008 and 
one on September 9, 2008. Both orders dismissed claims brought by the appellants, 
Bruce Hills and Judith Hills ("the Hills"), for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
The procedural history of this case is rather convoluted. It began with a lawsuit 
brought by the Hills against Skyline Electric Company ("Skyline"), which had performed 
electrical work at Mark Hills' jobsite. Mark Hills was working for United Parcel Service 
("UPS") when he was electrocuted and killed. (R. 0005.) The Hills brought suit against 
Skyline, seeking damages for Mark Hills' wrongful death. (R. 0069-77.) This first 
lawsuit has been referred to by the parties and trial courts involved as "Hills F\ 
Nearly a year after the Hills I complaint was filed, the Hills brought a second 
action ("Hills IF) against Skyline; UPS; and Liberty Mutual, UPS's worker's 
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compensation carrier. In the Hills II Complaint, the Hills requested exactly the same 
relief they had in Hills I—damages for Mark Hills' wrongful death—and also requested 
damages for the loss of an electrical box wall mount. The Hills contended that the 
defendants' spoliation of the wall mount "interfere[ed] with the Plaintiffs [sic] right to 
bring Causes of Action [sic] resulting from the wrongful death of Mark D. Hills[,]" that 
defendants had attempted to ''prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the 
defendants[,]" and that defendants had acted *'for the purpose of hindering said 
litigation." (R. 0001-24.) 
Liberty Mutual and UPS immediately moved to dismiss the Hills //Complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim under which relief could be granted. 
(R. 0053-83, 89-101.) The Hills //court eventually ordered that the two cases be 
consolidated for purposes of discovery, and later ordered that the motions to dismiss be 
stayed pending resolution of Hills I. (R. 595-598.) 
Skyline later amended its answer in the Hills I case, admitting liability for Mark 
Hills'death, but contesting damages. (R. 1084-88.) UPS and Liberty Mutual then 
renewed their motions to dismiss, arguing that because Skyline had admitted liability, the 
Hills could not show causation or damages. (R. 719-21, 722-24.) Several stages of 
briefing and oral arguments ensued, culminating in the Hills //court's dismissal, through 
two different orders, of all of the claims asserted in Hills II. (R. 1177-80, 1224-40.) It is 
from those orders of dismissal that the Hills now appeal. 
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B. Statement of Facts 
Because this case hinges on the purely legal question of the sufficiency of the Hills 
II Complaint, and because all of the facts alleged in that complaint must be accepted as 
true, Liberty Mutual will give a basic outline of the salient facts. 
The Hills' son, Mark Hills, was employed by UPS. (R. 0005.) Early in the 
morning of August 19, 2003, Mark Hills was working as a package handler. (R. 0005-6.) 
Because of faulty wiring that had been installed by Skyline, Mark was electrocuted and 
died. (Id.) UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Skyline were involved in efforts to investigate the 
cause of Mark's death. During the course of the investigation, a wall anchor that was part 
of an electrical box—the box that apparently caused Mark's electrocution—was lost. 
(R. 0008.) Following Utah Occupational Safety and Health's investigation, UPS was 
fined for having lost the wall anchor. (R. 1235.) 
The Hills I and Hills II cases ensued. After the two cases were consolidated for 
discovery, and after a series of motions to dismiss, oral arguments, and supplemental 
briefs, the Hills //court entered two orders which, combined, dismissed all of the claims 
asserted in Hills II for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
In particular, the first order dismissed (a) Skyline's cross-claim against UPS; (b) 
the Hills' negligence-based spoliation claims against all defendants; and (c) the Hills' 
"intentional misconduct" claim against all defendants. (R. 1177-80.) In dismissing the 
intentional misconduct claim, the Hills //court expressly dismissed the claims for 
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damages that duplicated those raised in Hills I (for example, loss of consortium, burial 
expenses, and other damages sought in the wrongful death action). The court left open 
the Hills' claims for any damages that might be found to flow from the alleged spoliation, 
including punitive damages. (Id.) 
The second order dismissed the remainder of the Hills' claims. In a lengthy and 
detailed memorandum decision and order, the trial court first acknowledged that the 
Hills' "intentional misconduct" and "tortuous [sic] interference" claims "appear to be 
intentional spoliation of evidence claims and at the hearing sounded like abuse of process 
claims." (R. 1226.) It noted that Utah law does not recognize a spoliation claim as 
described by the Hills, but concluded that it would look at the substance, rather than the 
labels, and that the Hills "appear to be claiming an independent tort of intentional 
spoliation of evidence." (R. 1230 e.g. (R. 1230.)) 
The court found scant support for the Hills' suggestion that the first-party 
evidentiary inference that was applied in Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co. 1 to remedy the 
loss of evidence in a products liability case could be stretched to support an independent 
cause of action seeking damages against a third party. (R. 1231.) Because there is no 
spoliation test that has been adopted in Utah, the trial court applied a general negligence 
analysis to the Hills' complaint. (R. 1232-33.) It noted that "[gjeneral tort law requires a 
plaintiff to prove that a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff damages." (R, 1232.) To 
make this showing, a plaintiff would have to prove that it was "'unsuccessful because of 
1 Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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the absence of the destroyed evidence, or at the very least, that the destruction of the 
evidence in question made pursuing the initial claim impossible'" and "'that the destroyed 
evidence would have enabled plaintiff successfully to pursue the initial civil action.'" (R. 
1233. (quoting Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. D.C. 2001).) 
Viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the Hills, the trial court 
observed that "Skyline's recent admission of liability in Hills I clearly establishes that 
Plaintiffs are successful in the [sic] proving liability in Hills /." (R. 1233. (emphasis in 
original).) Although the Hills were seeking damages in Hills II, "[a]ny spoliation of 
evidence by UPS and Liberty Mutual relates to proving liability, not damages. Because 
liability is no longer an issue in Hills /, Plaintiffs' legal remedy is not affected by UPS 
and Liberty Mutual's actions." (Id.) Because the Hills did not properly allege and could 
not, under any set of facts, show that UPS and Liberty Mutual caused damages, the Hills 
failed to state a claim under which relief could be granted. (Id.) 
The trial court was equally unpersuaded by the Hills' contentions that the 
spoliation "affected [their] probable expectancy in damages" because the damages for 
Mark Hills' death "were frozen at the time of [his] death. Whatever damages Plaintiffs 
are entitled to receive for [Mark Hills'] wrongful death will be determined in the Hills I 
case between Plaintiffs and Skyline." (R. 1234.) 
Similarly, the Hills' argument that "the delay created by UPS and Liberty Mutual's 
acts diminished the value of their claim in Hills F was unsupported by any legal 
authority. Furthermore, any suggestion that the defendants had delayed the Hills in 
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pursuit of their wrongful death claim stemmed solely from acts alleged to have occurred 
after Mark Hills' death, which were not pleaded in the Hills' Complaint. (R. 1234.) 
The trial court therefore dismissed the remainder of the Hills' claims in Hills II. 
Facts Not Properly Before the Hills II Trial Court 
The Hills II trial court allowed the Hills to submit additional facts and legal 
theories that went beyond the facts alleged in the Hills II Complaint in an effort to 
understand the Hills' somewhat murky damages claims that UPS and Liberty Mutual had 
"hindered" the Hills' prosecution of their wrongful death case. Although the trial court 
allowed these additional facts, the trial court confined its analysis to only the factual 
allegations in the Hills' Complaint. Because this appeal does not present a challenge to 
findings of fact, and because the analysis of a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is limited to the 
legal sufficiency of the allegations pleaded in the complaint, Liberty Mutual will not go 
into great detail in rebutting the shifting and amorphous "damage" claims made by the 
Hills throughout the course of this litigation. A succinct rebuttal of the Hills' allegations 
of "delay" and "impeding litigation" can be found in footnote 2 of the trial court's 
September 9, 2008 Order and in the Affidavit of Taggart Hansen. (R. 1229., 845-1088.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly ruled that the Hills' Complaint failed to state any claims 
on which relief could be granted. The Hills alleged that the defendants, including Liberty 
Mutual, had somehow prevented them from pursuing a wrongful death case against 
Skyline, even though they had filed that case almost a year before they filed the complaint 
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in Hills IL The Hills also alleged that the defendants had somehow delayed or hindered 
their prosecution of Hills I. Even accepting all of the Hills5 factual allegations as true, 
however, they failed to state any claims for relief that are cognizable under Utah law. 
Moreover, even if the Hills' factual allegations are analyzed under tests adopted by a 
small minority of jurisdictions, they still failed to state any claim upon which relief could 
be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IN RULING ON THE HILLS' CLAIMS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
LIMITED ITS ANALYSIS TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR 
COMPLAINT 
The trial court properly concluded that the Hills' complaint failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. "A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts 
alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
Interpreting this standard, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that dismissal is appropriate 
when, assuming the factual assertions in the complaint are correct, a party has failed to 
allege sufficient facts to meet all the elements of a claim. See Mackay v. Cannon, 1999 
UT App 36, ^13, 996 P.2d 1081. "[I]n deciding the propriety of a rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
trial courts are obliged to address the legal viability of a plaintiff s underlying claim as 
presented in the pleadings." Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, [^20, 193 P.3d 640. In 
Williams, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff s negligence claim, 
finding that plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would demonstrate a legal duty of 
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care was owed to her. See id. at |^25 (although plaintiff alleged the existence of a legal 
duty, the court concluded that Utah law did not recognize a duty of care absent some 
special relationship that plaintiff had not alleged). 
When reviewing the allegations in the Hills' Complaint, this Court must accept as 
true only the well-pleaded factual allegations. The sufficiency of the Hills' Complaint 
must be based on the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions that are stated. See 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9,1J60, 70 P.3d 17. In 
making its ruling, the trial court properly declined to consider factual allegations that 
were not part of the Hills' Complaint and properly limited its analysis to only the well-
pleaded facts in the Complaint. 
IL THE HILLS' FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING LIBERTY 
MUTUAL'S POST-INVESTIGATION CONDUCT WERE NOT 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
Although the Hills' brief is filled with allegations about defendants' improper acts 
with respect to the litigation and discovery in this case, this Court should not consider 
these facts, allegations, or legal theories. As the trial court properly noted, the Hills 
raised these allegations only in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss and the 
allegations are not contained their Complaint. (R. at 1228-29 n.2.) Accordingly, the trial 
court properly reviewed only the allegations in the Complaint to determine whether, 
taking the allegations as true, the Complaint stated a claim for which relief could be 
granted. 
In addition, the Hills never moved to amend the Complaint. They made no oral 
argument that the Complaint should be amended and failed to submit a formal written 
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motion to amend the complaint. See Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, [^23, 199 
P.2d 971 (stating that in order to properly move to amend a pleading, a party must submit 
a written motion and a supporting memorandum providing the grounds for the motion and 
the relief sought). Because the Hills failed to properly move to amend the complaint and 
because the trial court properly declined to consider any new facts or new theories in 
ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss, the new facts and new theories were not 
preserved for appellate review and are not properly before this Court on appeal. 
Accordingly, this Court should not consider plaintiffs' allegations relating to events that 
occurred after the investigation of the accident. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE HILLS' 
SPOLIATION-BASED CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT STATE ANY 
CLAIM UNDER WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED 
The trial court correctly perceived that the substance, if not the labels applied to, 
the Hills' claims for relief "appear to be intentional spoliation of evidence claims". 
(R. 1226.) Taking all the facts that were pleaded by the Hills as true, the trial court 
correctly concluded that the fact that the Hills established Skyline's liability in Hills I 
meant that under no state of the law could the Hills recover. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Hills' spoliation claims, 
however they are described, for at least two reasons. First, "spoliation" is not a 
recognized cause of action under Utah law. Accordingly, the spoliation claims pleaded 
by the Hills failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Second, even if 
this Court recognizes spoliation as an independent tort, the Hills' Complaint failed to 
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allege facts that would satisfy the requirements of the cause of action, whether it is 
analyzed under the test for spoliation as an independent cause of action or under a 
traditional negligence analysis. 
Interestingly, the Hills' opening brief on appeal completely avoids any 
examination of the facts pleaded in the Complaint and whether those facts are sufficient 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Instead, most of the brief is devoted 
to a description of spoliation as a cause of action (one that has been recognized by only a 
small number of jurisdictions that have considered it), combined with lengthy assertions 
of alleged fact that were never raised in the Complaint. Liberty Mutual will briefly 
discuss the contours of spoliation as an independent tort (as well as the reasons why most 
jurisdictions have rejected the tort), and then show, by reference to the Hills' Complaint, 
that the facts alleged cannot meet the elements of negligent or intentional spoliation. 
A. UTAH LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE SPOLIATION AS AN 
INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION. FOR THE SAME REASONS 
THAT MOST COURTS HAVE REJECTED SPOLIATION AS A TORT, 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO RECOGNIZE THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
In support of their arguments that the tort of spoliation should be recognized in 
Utah, the Hills blend and blur various other doctrines related to intentional interference-
type torts and suggest at times that these other torts support recognizing spoliation as a 
cause of action in Utah. At other points, they have argued that they are not truly alleging 
"spoliation" and have seemed to imply that that label has been unwillingly foisted upon 
them. {See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 11 (describing "original claims for relief as unow deemed 
causes of action in spoliation").) As the Hills have explicitly acknowledged, though, and 
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as the trial court correctly concluded, the causes of action alleged by the Hills are 
substantively based on the theory of spoliation as a tort. See Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 
864, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("In characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to 
the nature of the action and not the pleading labels chosen."). In particular, the Hills' 
focus has been on an intentional, rather than negligent, tort. 
Only a handful of states recognize spoliation as an independent cause of action, 
and nearly all states that have considered the question have rejected the position advanced 
by the Hills and have instead concluded that traditional negligence principles and other 
remedies are sufficient to deter and punish spoliation without the significant downside 
that the independent tort carries. See, e.g., Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Constr. Co., 
658 So.2d 408, 413 (Ala. 1995); Goffv. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc., 27 S.W.3d 387, 
391 (Ark. 2000) (collecting cases); Dowdle Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 
1124 (Miss. 2002) (collecting cases); Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1998); Margaret M. Koesel et al., Spoliation of Evidence: Sanctions and 
Remedies for Destruction of Evidence in Civil Litigation 81, 83 (American Bar Ass'n 
2006). 
California was an early adopter of the tort, and its Smith opinion is relied on by the 
few states that followed California's lead. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 
829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). But just more than a decade after Smith, California abandoned 
the cause of action because of the problems inherent in the "tort." See Temple Comm. 
Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999) (holding no cause of action for third-
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party spoliation); Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998) 
(holding no cause of action for first-party spoliation). Other states have recognized these 
same difficulties.2 The problems recognized by other jurisdictions would work similar 
mischief if the cause of action were recognized in Utah. 
1. Uncertainty of Damages 
The most problematic issue is that damages are so inherently uncertain in a 
spoliation action that most courts conclude they are all but impossible to ascertain. 
Koesel at 85. This is because "there is no way to establish with certainty what the 
missing evidence would have shown and the 'inherent difficulty of proving the fact of 
injury.'" Koesel at 85 (quoting Sean R. Levine, Note, Spoliation of Evidence in West 
Virginia: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth?, 104 W. Va. L. Rev. 419, 438 (Winter 
2002)). 
Concerns about the impossibility of proving damages are perhaps even greater in 
third-party situations such as that presented by this case. For example, spoliation might 
injure both parties in the underlying litigation, which could then create two claims with 
2 These potential problems were neatly summarized by the Kansas Supreme Court early 
in the development of spoliation cases as including 
the generation of endless litigation [ . . . ;] inconsistency with 
the intent of the workers' compensation laws; rank 
speculation as to whether the plaintiff could have ever 
recovered in the underlying action and, if so, the speculative 
nature of the damages; the limitless scope of the new duty 
which would be created; and the unwarranted intrusion on the 
property rights of a person who lawfully disposes of his own 
property. 
Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987). 
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verdicts that could be duplicative or inconsistent. See Temple, 976 P.2d at 232. Or, as is 
precisely the situation in this appeal, "the plaintiff in the underlying litigation may claim 
that but for the spoliation, his or her recovery would have been greater." Id. 
In this case, it is uncertain what measure of damages the Hills could possibly 
claim, or how damages could be determined by a finder of fact. The damages for Mark 
Hills' death were fixed at the moment he died; the purported damages caused by 
appellees' "delays" were nothing more than typical delays that are inherent in the 
litigation process and are not actionable (but most importantly, they were not pleaded in 
the Complaint).3 Nor have the Hills been clear about the damages sought. They are 
asking for damages identical to those requested in Hills I for Mark Hills' wrongful death. 
They are asking for punitive damages. And at times, they seem to concede that the only 
measure of damages might be limited to certain costs in the Hills I litigation. (Br. Aplt. 
at 20.) 
In fact, the Hills have suffered no damages. As discussed below, Skyline has 
admitted its negligence in Hills /, and the only issue remaining is the amount of damages 
suffered as a result of Mark Hill's death. This is properly determined in Hills I. The 
spoliation alleged in Hills II did nothing to prevent the Hills from making their wrongful 
3 "From reviewing the facts in the Complaint and those additional facts in the briefs and 
even viewing those facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court is not persuaded 
that Defendants did anything more than defend their respective interests and participate in 
the legal process. Wrongful death cases, by their very nature are cases that generally do 
not resolve quickly." (R. 1228-29 n.2.) This finding is amply supported by the record 
(see, e.g., Hansen Affidavit, R. 845-1088), and the Hills have not marshaled the evidence 
to challenge the finding. 
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death claim. Moreover, the Hills were not prevented from fully articulating their case in 
Hills I; they were not hindered or impeded in any way because the facts alleged in Hills II 
are the same as those known to the Hills at the time they filed their complaint in Hills I; 
the Hills II case presented no new facts. 
2. Creation of Needless Litigation 
When it did away with the first-party cause of action for spoliation, the California 
Supreme Court noted that "using tort law to correct misconduct arising during litigation 
raises policy considerations not present in deciding whether to create tort remedies for 
harms arising in other contexts." Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 515. For that reason, the 
court has "favored remedying litigation-related misconduct by sanctions imposed within 
the underlying lawsuit rather than by creating new derivative torts." Id. Encouraging the 
use of sanctions, rather than further litigation, also promotes the finality of judgments. Id. 
at 515-16. Moreover, this approach is consistent with the policy of not allowing tort 
actions for analogous acts, such as witnesses who commit perjury, conceal evidence, or 
withhold evidence. See id. 
Allowing plaintiffs to litigate spoliation claims as separate causes of action in 
different suits also creates a system of potentially endless litigation, a scenario that was 
best described by the California Supreme Court when it rejected third-party causes of 
action for spoliation. 
The spoliation tort not only would provide the disappointed 
litigant a second opportunity to seek compensation, it would 
require retrial of the first case in order to permit the plaintiff 
to demonstrate in what respect the alleged spoliation altered 
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the outcome of the first trial. Indeed, the matter might still 
continue, for spoliation in the second trial might give rise to 
yet a third lawsuit. 
Temple Comm. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 229. These multiple suits would also "give rise to a 
'significant potential for jury confusion and inconsistency.'" Temple, 976 P.2d at 229 
(quoting Cedars-Sinai). 
3. Adequacy of Available Remedies to Deter and Punish Spoliation 
"The infrequency of spoliation suggests that existing remedies are generally 
effective at deterring spoliation." Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 518. Among the existing 
remedies relied on by many courts are evidentiary inferences, sanctions for misconduct 
during discovery, disciplinary sanctions against attorneys, and even criminal penalties. 
Similar remedies are available under Utah law and, as in other states, these remedies are 
adequate to deter and punish spoliation without creating a new, independent tort. 
For example, Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets out a variety of 
sanctions for failure to comply with discovery, including evidentiary inferences, default 
judgments or dismissals against the offending party, ordering the payment of costs and 
even attorney fees, and holding the offender in contempt of court. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b). 
In addition, Rule 37(g) makes clear that the court has "inherent power" to enter any 
sanctions "if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a 
document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty." Id. R. 
37(g). And section 76-8-510.5 provides criminal penalties for tampering with evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510.5. 
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"[A]s the California courts learned after 14 years of experience with this tort, any 
benefits obtained by recognizing the spoliation tort are outweighed by the burdens 
imposed." Dow die Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002). 
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Hills' claims and decline to 
recognize this "burdensome and inaccurate instrument of derivative tort litigation" as 
have the vast majority of courts that have considered the issue. Dowdle, 831 So.2d at 
1132. 
B. EVEN IF THIS COURT RECOGNIZES SPOLIATION AS A CAUSE OF 
ACTION, THE HILLS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 
SPOLIATION UNDER WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED 
Whether analyzed under the schema developed by the few courts that recognize 
spoliation or whether analyzed under traditional negligence doctrines, the Hills failed to 
state claims under which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
dismissed the Hills' claims for "spoliation," howsoever denominated, and the trial court's 
rulings should be affirmed by this Court. 
1. The Hills Cannot Show That the Spoliation Caused Damages 
Virtually every court considering the question has concluded that spoliation 
damages are available only if the plaintiff can prove that the spoliation caused the loss of 
the underlying lawsuit. See, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying Florida law and stating plaintiffs "must 
'demonstrate that [they] were unable to prove [their] underlying action owing to the 
unavailability of the evidence" (quoting Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So.2d 313, 
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315 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1990)); Kolanovic v. Gida, 77 F. Supp. 595 (D. NJ. 1999) ("'If 
plaintiff prevails on his underlying cause of action, there are no damages resulting from 
the destruction of the evidence.'" (Citation omitted.)); Lincoln Ins. Co. v. Home 
Emergency Servs., Inc., 812 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing tort "where 
a party is unable to prove their cause due to the loss or destruction of key evidence.. . . 
[a] spoliation claim . . . compensates the plaintiff for the loss of recovery in the 
underlying case due to the plaintiffs inability to prove the case because of the lost or 
destroyed evidence" (emphasis added)); Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 
(Mont. 1999) 
Although the Hills' factual allegations, legal theories, and damages claims have 
remained floating targets throughout the briefing and argument of this case below, 
Liberty assumes that the Hills' primary objective is to press theories of intentional tort in 
the hopes of being awarded punitive damages. But because plaintiffs have pleaded both 
negligent and intentional tort theories, Liberty will address the Hills' spoliation arguments 
under both theories. 
2. The Hills Failed to State a Claim for Intentional Spoliation As An 
Independent Cause of Action 
Although the wording of the tests varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in 
general the elements for a claim of intentional spoliation are "(i) pending or probable 
litigation involving the plaintiff, (ii) knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation 
exists or is probable, (iii) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt 
plaintiffs case, (iv) disruption of the plaintiffs case, and (v) damages proximately caused 
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by the defendant's acts[.]" Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 
1993); Margaret M. Koesel et al., Spoliation of Evidence: Sanctions and Remedies for 
Destruction of Evidence in Civil Litigation 88-89 (American Bar Ass'n 2006). As the 
Hills acknowledge, the most consistent elements of the various spoliation tests are those 
requiring the plaintiffs to prove (a) causation and (b) that they were unable to pursue their 
underlying suit. (Aplt. Br. at 17.) 
The Hills' Complaint pleads only the following facts regarding causation and 
damages: by engaging in the alleged spoliation the defendants "interferefed] with the 
Plaintiffs [sic] right to bring Causes of Action [sic] resulting from the wrongful death of 
Mark D. Hills[,]" attempted to "prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the 
defendants[,]" and acted "for the purpose of hindering said litigation." (R. 0015, 
0017-18,0020-21.) 
Those allegations simply do not raise a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
First, the Hills' "right to bring causes of action" was not "interfered with" in any way; in 
fact, their wrongful death suit was filed nearly a year before Hills II, and was based on 
identical facts and information. Second, nothing in the Complaint supports the allegation 
that the defendants tried to "prevent" the Hills from filing suit in Hills L4 Finally, the 
allegation that the defendants intended to "hinder" the litigation is unsupported by the 
4 Nor would such a proposition make any sense. As UPS' workers' compensation carrier 
, Liberty Mutual paid benefits to Mark Hills' estate and would have subrogation rights 
against any recovery made by the estate. It would therefore be in Liberty Mutual's 
interest to have the plaintiffs sue Skyline. 
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facts pleaded, is undermined by the unavailability of a legal remedy for this claimed 
harm, and is fatally undermined by the fact that Skyline admitted liability in Hills L The 
Hills were fully able to file suit and prosecute their claims against Skyline, and in fact 
were successful at establishing Skyline's liability. 
3. The Hills Failed to State a Claim for Negligent Spoliation As An 
Independent Cause of Action 
As with intentional spoliation, although there is no universally-agreed upon test for 
negligent spoliation the courts that recognize the tort use essentially the same test. To 
prove negligent spoliation, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) [the] existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or 
contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to that 
action; (3) destruction of that evidence . . . ; (4) significant 
impairment in the ability to prove the potential civil action; 
(5) a proximate relationship between the impairment of the 
underlying suit and the unavailability of the destroyed 
evidence; (6) a significant possibility of success of the 
potential civil action if the evidence were available; and (7) 
damages adjusted for the estimated likelihood of success in 
the potential civil action. 
Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 854 (D.C. 1998); Oliver, 993 P.2d at 19; 
Koesel., Spoliation of Evidence at 89-90. 
Even accepting all of the Hills' well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, 
the Hills failed to state a claim under which relief could be granted. The Hills II 
Complaint alleges only that defendants' loss of the wall mount interfered with the Hills' 
"right to bring Causes of Action [sic,]" that the defendants attempted to "prevent the 
Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the defendants[,]" and that defendants acted 
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"for the purpose of hindering said litigation." (R. 0015, 0017-18, 0020-21.) 
The facts alleged in the Hills' Complaint simply cannot show "a significant 
impairment in the ability to prove" Hills /, because in fact the Hills did prove their lawsuit 
in the underlying case. The parties conducted discovery, and after the depositions of 
certain witnesses Skyline conceded its liability. The Hills have effectively prevailed in 
Hills I; the only matter left to determine is the amount of their damages, which were fixed 
at the moment of Mark Hills' death. 
The Hills' claims that appellees collectively have somehow increased the cost of 
their prosecuting Hills I are of no avail. First, on appeal the Hills have not challenged the 
trial court's ancillary fmding5 that any alleged delays were merely inherent to the nature 
of litigating a wrongful death suit. But most importantly, the Hills did not plead any of 
these facts in the Hills II Complaint, and the matter was not properly before the trial court 
in its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. 
4. The Hills Failed to State a Claim Under a Traditional Negligence 
Analysis 
Most courts that have been presented with claims for spoliation as a stand-alone 
tort have rejected that approach and have, instead, analyzed the claims under a traditional 
negligence approach. If this Court chooses not to recognize spoliation as an independent 
tort, it should still affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Hills failed to state a claim 
5 Liberty Mutual describes this as an "ancillary" finding because it was not essential to 
the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the Hills' Complaint. 
Although the trial court considered the Hansen Affidavit and concluded that the 
defendants had not delayed or hindered the Hills' prosecution of their case, the trial court 
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upon which relief could be granted under a traditional negligence analysis. 
To show that Liberty was liable in negligence, the Hills would have to prove that 
"the defendant owned plaintiff a duty, that the defendant breached that duty, that the 
breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and that the plaintiff in 
fact suffered injuries or damages." Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 UT App 438, 
[^12, 83 P.3d 391. Even accepting their factual allegations as true, for the reasons 
discussed above the Hills' Complaint did not state actionable claims for causation and 
damages. The trial court therefore correctly dismissed the Complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6). 
Although the Hills assert a claim for negligence, the factual allegations in the 
Complaint allege intentional conduct on the part of Liberty Mutual. When faced with 
allegations of intentional conduct and a negligence claim, courts have noted the 
inconsistency between intentional conduct that yielded an intended result and a 
negligence claim. See, e.g., Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416, 424 (Idaho 
1996) (declining to consider negligence claim because factual allegations were of 
intentional conduct); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 864 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Kan. 
1994) (claim of embracery requires intentional conduct which is not consistent with claim 
of negligence). Because the Hills have alleged Liberty Mutual intentionally spoliated 
evidence and intentionally conspired to conceal its acts, the trial court correctly dismissed 
the Hills' negligence-based claims against Liberty Mutual. 
did not rely on any of these facts because they were not pleaded in the Hills' Complaint 
23 
Moreover, the Hills did not oppose Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss on 
negligence and have therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Before the trial 
court, Liberty Mutual did not rely on the exclusive remedy bar under the Workers' 
Compensation Statute to defend against the negligence claim. Rather, Liberty Mutual 
argued that the Hills' Complaint had not established a legal duty between them and 
Liberty Mutual. 
It is "axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a duty." 
Lovelandv. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987). The determination of the 
existence of a duty is a legal question for the trial court. Id. at 766. According to the 
Hills, the duties that Liberty Mutual allegedly breached were duties to preserve the 
equipment, materials, or evidence pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark 
Hills, duties that were imposed on Liberty Mutual by Utah OSHA ("UOSHA"), the Utah 
Labor Commission, or related laws. Such an allegation is fatal to the Hills' claim because 
the duty arising from an instruction to preserve evidence issued by UOSHA (if applicable 
to Liberty Mutual) does not run to the Hills, but rather runs to UOSHA. In analyzing the 
duty issue, this Court should remember that Liberty Mutual was not Mark Hills' 
employer, and it did not own the premises or control the property at the accident site. 
In Glotzbach, CPA v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 2006), a company called 
Midwest Material Services provided environmental cleanup and the handling and transfer 
of hazardous materials as a service to its customers. Midwest was engaged to clean a 
(R. 1228-29 n.2.) 
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large holding tank for Ashland Chemical and William Darling, one of Midwest's owners, 
working with Drew Froman, began emptying the tank using an electric pump and other 
equipment. There was an explosion that caused fatal burns to Froman. See id at 338. 
A few days after the explosion, the Indiana Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration ("IOSHA") contacted Darling to confirm that he still had possession of 
the pump, and instructed him not to dispose of it. Four days later, when IOSHA and the 
Fire Department contacted Darling, he reported that everything he had collected from the 
site had been thrown away. Froman's estate filed a wrongful death complaint against 
Midwest and the "John Doe" manufacturer of the pump, but later amended the complaint 
to state a claim for negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence against Midwest. 
On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs were asserting that 
IOSHA's instructions to Darling to retain the pump created the kind of necessary special 
relationship between the parties to establish a duty on Darling's part to preserve the 
evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, rejected that argument. The Court 
noted that "IOSHA's instruction to retain the debris made no reference to the need to 
preserve the evidence for Froman's use in private litigation. Otherwise stated, to the 
extent IOSHA's request created any duty to preserve the evidence, it was a duty owed to 
IOSHA, not to Froman or his estate." Id. at 340. 
Similarly, any instructions that UOSHA may have given to any representative of 
Liberty Mutual would not create or impose upon Liberty Mutual any duty running to the 
plaintiffs in this case. If any kind of duty could be contemplated (and, again given 
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Liberty Mutual's lack of ownership or control, it is questionable a duty arises), it would 
be a duty Liberty Mutual owed to UOSHA, not to the Hills. See also OMI Holdings, 
Inc. v. Howell, 864 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding court's instructions to 
expert witness to avoid communication with jurors did not create duty flowing to 
opposing party, the breach of which would be actionable). 
No special duty of care existed between Liberty Mutual and the Hills. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that in Utah, a worker's compensation insurer owes 
no duty of good faith to an injured employee, but rather the duty runs to the employer, 
with whom the carrier is in privity of contract. See Savage v. Educator's Ins. Co., 874 
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
After Liberty Mutual briefed this issue to the trial court, the Hills failed to oppose 
Liberty Mutual's separate motion to dismiss. The Hills' Complaint does not establish the 
required elements of negligence, and the Hills have failed to preserve this issue for 
appellate review. 
IV. THE HILLS CANNOT MEET THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ANY 
CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE 
A. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE 
Although the Hills do not argue any claims for intentional interference with 
economic relations as outlined in Leigh Furniture in their appellate brief, out of an 
abundance of caution Liberty Mutual will address this tort because the Complaint 
identifies intentional conduct and a tort claim. The Hills' brief cites to Leigh Furniture 
and the elements of the intentional interference tort in order to argue that the analytical 
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leap from the recognized intentional interference tort to a spoliation tort is not too great 
and Utah should recognize a spoliation cause of action. (Br. Aplt. at 24.) Although the 
Hills do not argue that they have a claim for intentional interference with economic 
relations, they argue that they could meet the required elements of the claim because: 
Appellees (1) intentionally interfered with evidence 
Appellants needed to pursue an underlying suit, as 
demonstrated by the willful violation OSHA initially issued; 
(2) Appellants [sic] effected such actions for an improper 
purpose, to hide the cause of the electrocution; and (3) the 
acts caused harm to Appellants by forcing Appellants' to file 
an action for spoliation given the uncertainty of causation and 
the viability of proving the underlying Hills I suit, and 
secondarily, harmed Appellants with the expense of litigating 
with non-party UPS to compel discovery in Hills I of the 
OSHA accident report (UPS had restricted OSHA from 
releasing the report. (R. at 825-27).); and the expense and 
time of litigating with UPS to compel the Heath Engineering 
reports and Heath Engineering personal [sic] responsible for 
evidence alteration and destruction. (R. at 913-927). 
(Br. Aplt. at 24.) 
In this argument, however, the Hills have used both the allegations in the 
complaint and additional factual elements relating to conduct after litigation had started. 
As discussed above, the allegations of post-litigation conduct used to satisfy the third 
prong are not in the Complaint and should not be considered in reviewing the trial court's 
Order. Indeed, the trial court stated that the additional facts were improperly raised in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss, and it would not consider "these additional facts and 
new theory." (R. at 1228-29 n.2) 
Even assuming the argument was preserved for appeal, the Complaint does not 
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satisfy the elements of an intentional interference claim. In order to assert a claim for 
intentional interference, the Hills must prove the following elements: "(I) that the 
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic 
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). The 
Hills have failed to allege how Liberty Mutual interfered with their existing or potential 
economic relations. They filed Hills /prior to initiating Hills II, and they knew all of the 
facts concerning the electrocution and the investigation into the cause of the electrocution 
before filing Hills L 
The Hills have failed to allege that Liberty Mutual's acts prevented them from 
filing a complaint in Hills /, caused them to miss a statute of limitations, or caused a 
defendant in Hills Ho become insolvent or judgment proof. With Skyline Electric's 
admission of liability, the Hills have only to prove their damages—a required element of 
any cause of action. As the trial court correctly noted, the damages for a wrongful death 
were fixed at the moment of death. Thus, the allegations in the Hills' Complaint fail to 
allege how Liberty Mutual intentionally interfered with an existing or potential economic 
relation. In fact, Hills //was nothing more than alternative action in the event the 
spoliation precluded the Hills from being able to prove liability in Hills L Since liability 
is not in dispute, the Hills cannot point to any interference with an existing or potential 
economic relation. They will be able to recover whatever damages can be proved in 
Hills I 
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Under the second prong, the Hills argue that Liberty Mutual acted with an 
improper purpose as required by Leigh Furniture. (Br. Aplt. at 24.) Interpreting this 
prong, this Court stated: "Improper purpose is established by a showing that the actor's 
predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff." St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 201. Thus, 
even though a defendant's acts may injure the plaintiff, the plaintiff is required to 
demonstrate that predominant motivation behind the act was to injure the plaintiff and not 
some other legitimate reason. See id. In St. Benedict's, the hospital and a developer 
solicited tenants from another office building with which the hospital had a contractual 
agreement to find tenants. The developer of the other building sued the hospital and 
argued that the hospital had improperly solicited its tenants and harmed it. This Court 
determined the hospital had a legitimate economic interest in soliciting the tenants and 
thus, its acts were not predominantly to injure the other building developer. See id. 
In this matter, the Hills cannot demonstrate and did not allege that UPS's or 
Liberty Mutuai's acts in investigating the cause of the electrocution were motivated by a 
desire to harm the Hills. Mark Hills had already been electrocuted. As his employer, 
UPS was not subject to a tort claim. Liberty Mutual was already responsible for any 
workers' compensation benefits. The investigation was done to determine the cause of 
the accident and to prevent others from being injured. The investigation was not done to 
prevent a wrongful death claim against a third party for which UPS and Liberty Mutual 
had no responsibility. 
In addition, the Hills' claim would also fail because they cannot demonstrate the 
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final prongs of causation or damages. See, e.g., Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 305-06. As 
the trial court noted, the damages for a wrongful death claim were fixed at the moment of 
death. None of defendants' acts could affect the amount of these damages. Since Skyline 
has admitted liability, none of defendants' acts affected the Hills' right to recover these 
damages. Accordingly, any act of spoliation had no effect on the Hills' economic 
expectancy, which was fixed at the moment Mark Hills was electrocuted. 
B. INTERFERENCE WITH A CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. A b use of process 
The Hills argue that Liberty Mutual has intentionally interfered with their right to 
bring a cause of action, but they have never identified a specific cause of action that Utah 
recognizes on this issue. The trial court noted that the claim sounded like one for abuse 
of process. As noted above, any claim for abuse of process is not supported by the 
allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. Moreover, plaintiffs could not satisfy the required 
elements of this claim. 
In order to state a claim for abuse of process, plaintiffs "must demonstrate first, an 
ulterior purpose; [and] second, an act in the use of process not proper in the regular 
prosecution of the proceedings." Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^65, 116 
P.3d 323. "This ulterior purpose usually involves 4coerci[ng another through use of 
process] to obtain [something] . . . such as the surrender of property or payment of money, 
or 'compelling [the] victim to do something which he would not otherwise be legally 
obligated to do." Puttuck, 2008 UT App 362 at [^14 (alterations in original) (citation 
30 
omitted). 
The Hills' new and unsubstantiated factual allegations merely accuse defendants of 
causing them delay in the litigation of Hills L This allegation is not sufficient to 
demonstrate interference with a cause of action under Utah law. Here, appellants filed 
the Hills II Complaint in August of 2005, Liberty Mutual filed its Motion to Dismiss in 
November of 2005, and Skyline cross-claimed against UPS, which moved to dismiss the 
cross-claim. Oral argument was heard on all pending motions in April 2006, which 
resulted in more briefing and Skyline's Motion to Consolidate Hills I and Hills II. Judge 
Hansen then recused himself, resulting in additional delay. However, it is clear under 
Utah law that even if Liberty Mutual's defense of Hills //had some collateral negative 
effect on the Hills, such as the expenditure of time, of resources, or emotional strain, that 
is not sufficient to state a cause of action for abuse of process. See Bennett v. Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, f 53, 70 P.3d 17. 
The Hills have not alleged any other facts about how Liberty Mutual has misused 
the litigation process. Specifically, none of the defendants initiated the litigation or filed 
counterclaims against plaintiffs. As the trial court noted, the Hills filed no motions to 
compel and no motions for sanctions. In short, the Hills have not alleged any facts that 
would rise to the level of abuse of process. 
2. Judicial Proceeding Privilege 
In addition, the judicial proceeding privilege recognizes that the statements of 
attorneys, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in the judicial process enjoy an 
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absolute privilege against liability for torts if the statements are made during or 
preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Three elements must be satisfied for the privilege to 
apply: 1) "the statement must have been made during or in the course of a judicial 
proceeding; 2) the statement must have some reference to the subject matter of the 
proceeding; and 3) the statement must have been made by someone acting in the capacity 
of judge, jury, witness, litigant or counsel." Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 
1997). 
The Hills' claims against Liberty Mutual would be encompassed by these three 
elements. Assuming defendants' post-litigation conduct was properly pleaded, these acts 
fall within the broad language of "in the course of a judicial proceeding." Price, 949 P.2d 
at 1256-57. Similarly, the requirement of "referencing the subject matter" is read 
expansively and includes any reference to the judicial proceeding, regardless of whether 
the reference is material. See Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1312 (Utah 1990). 
The application of the judicial privilege is not limited to defamatory remarks. In 
Price, the privilege was applied to claims for intentional interference with business 
relations. In DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979, 986 (Utah 1999), this Court applied the 
privilege to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The privilege would 
also encompass the novel claims now advanced by the Hills. 
Although Liberty Mutual cannot identify exactly what post-litigation conduct 
allegedly hindered or interfered with plaintiffs' legal process, such claims would have 
been in anticipation of the litigation or made after Hills I was filed, and, therefore, the 
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judicial privilege would apply. 
3. Interference With a Cause of Action 
Other jurisdictions have wrestled with a claim for interference with a cause of 
action, and each has declined to adopt the cause of action. For example, In Wilson v. 
Colonial Penn Life Ins., 454 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Minn. 1978), May Wilson sued her health 
insurer, Colonial Penn, for its denial of benefits for her hospital stay. The Amended 
Complaint stated four causes of action: 1) breach of the hospital indemnity insurance 
contract; 2) a claim for tortious interference with the physician/patient relationship and 
tortious interference with legal process; 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress/bad 
faith; and 4) invasion of privacy. In dismissing the various tort actions and remanding the 
case, the court directly analyzed the tortious interference with legal process claim. "First, 
the court is aware of no reported case nor any treatise which recognizes the cause of 
action sounding in tort denominated as interference with legal process." Id, at 1211. 
Second, the court observed that the facts of the case did not support such a claim, 
even if the court were to recognize it because the interference6 occurred prior to the 
initiation of the lawsuit and, therefore, would fail to support the claim. More important to 
this Court's analysis, however, is the following reasoning: 
Likewise, even if Count II were to be construed as a claim 
that the defendants somehow caused the plaintiffs to delay 
their commencement of this action, it would still be subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim. It is true that Count II 
could be construed to allege that the defendants' actions 
6 The insurer was accused of intimidating the treating physician and the hospital into not 
producing records that substantiated plaintiffs treatment. 
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caused the plaintiffs to delay their bringing an action to 
enforce their rights under the insurance policy. However, 
there is no allegation that the delay resulted in some rights 
being barred by the statute of limitations or that the insurance 
company had become insolvent and the value of the plaintiffs' 
claim against the company was thereby diminished. Mere 
delay without other injury is not actionable. 
Id. at 1212 (emphasis added); see also Kopffv. World Research Group LLC, 519 F. Supp. 
2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2007). 
The Idaho Supreme Court also wrestled with the concept of intentional 
interference with prospective civil action in Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 
416 (1996). This was a tort action brought against Hartford for its alleged misconduct in 
investigating and litigating a wrongful death claim brought against its insured, the City of 
McCall ("McCall"). The Yoakums' son died when the McCall golf course maintenance 
vehicle he was riding in tipped over during a turn. 
An employee of the Idaho State Police (Thompson) conducted an accident 
investigation and concluded that the vehicle was unsafe to operate at any speed. Shortly 
after this, Thompson left his employment with the Idaho State Police. Hartford then hired 
Thompson and had him actually drive the vehicle, which he had not driven when writing 
his original report. Id. at 419. Thompson determined that he had made an error in his 
original calculation and changed his original opinion, now favoring McCall. Meanwhile, 
Hartford's claim manager had allegedly been trying to intimidate the driver of the golf 
course vehicle. 
The Yoakums filed a lawsuit against Hartford alleging civil rights violations, a 
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racketeering claim, and various intentional torts. The trial court granted Hartford's 
summary judgment motion and on appeal, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. In the 
course of the court's analysis, although it could find no basis for the plaintiffs' spoliation 
claim, it took the opportunity to opine on a cause of action for intentional interference 
with a prospective legal claim. Id. at 423-24. The court observed that although such a 
claim was not confined solely to the spoliation of evidence, "a claim for intentional 
interference with a prospective civil action must nonetheless allege and prove conduct 
that amounts to an unreasonable interference by the defendant, taking into account any 
recognized privileges that party may hold." Id. at 424. Because the record before them 
did not demonstrate that Hartford's conduct amounted to an "unreasonable interference" 
with the Yoakum's wrongful death claim (although the court went out of its way to 
condemn the conduct), the court concluded there was no basis for the new cause of 
action. 
The State of Ohio does have a cause of action that is denominated "interference 
with a legal remedy," but it is premised on spoliation of evidence. To state a claim for 
interference with a legal remedy in Ohio, a plaintiff must show: 1) pending or probable 
litigation involving the plaintiff, 2) knowledge on the part of the defendant that litigation 
exists or is probable, 3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt 
the plaintiffs case, 4) disruption of the plaintiffs case, and 5) damages proximately 
caused by the defendant's acts. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 
(1993). In this case, the Hills cannot meet these elements because not only have they 
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been able to timely pursue their initial civil action, but also the defendant in Hills I, 
Skyline Electric, has stipulated to liability, leaving the Hills to prove their damages 
(which were fixed at the moment of Mark Hills' death). 
Under the facts of this case, i.e., a situation where Liberty Mutual, a workers' 
compensation insurer, responds to a request from its insured to come to an accident site, 
this Court should be reluctant to recognize a claim that would have the effect of chilling 
and interfering with the insurer-insured relationship. Taking into consideration the 
allegations in the Hills II Complaint, the Hills have not identified post-litigation conduct 
by Liberty Mutual that would justify such an invasion of the insurer-insured relationship. 
The Hills cannot cobble together a claim for either intentional hindrance or tortious 
interference with legal process that is cognizable under Utah law. 
As the trial court noted in discussing the Hills' new theories of delay: "the Court 
is not persuaded that Defendants did anything more than defend their respective interests 
and participate in the legal process." (R. at 1229 n.2.) The trial court went on to note: 
"If Defendants had hindered or delayed for an improper purpose, this Court would expect 
to see motions to compel and motions for sanctions in Hills /." (Id.) In other words, both 
the Complaint and the record as a whole are devoid of any properly preserved factual 
allegations that Liberty Mutual prevented or obstructed the Hills from timely filing or 
timely proving liability in Hills I. See, e.g., Bennett v. Town ofRiverhead, 940 F. Supp. 
481, 492 (E.D. N.Y. 1996) (holding no factual allegations supported claim that 
defendant's acts interfered with plaintiffs right to seek all judicial remedies available). 
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While Utah does recognize a cause of action for abuse of process, Utah does not 
recognize a cause of action for interference with a cause of action. Strong policy reasons 
exist for not expanding the scope of the recognized intentional interference torts in Utah 
to include a claim for interference with a cause of action. In refusing to recognize a cause 
of action for perjury or third party spoliation of evidence, a district court in Kansas 
discussed that other remedies exist for the wrongful conduct that forms the basis of these 
kinds of intentional torts. See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 864 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. 
Kan. 1994). Specifically, criminal statutes exist to prevent certain conduct, and when 
criminal statutes do not cover the conduct, civil remedies are available to redress the 
wrongful conduct. See id. In many instances, plaintiffs are attempting to initiate 
duplicative litigation when the trial court in the underlying action is in the best position to 
address and correct the alleged wrongful conduct. 
If defendants had caused needless delay or otherwise improperly hindered 
discovery in Hills /, the trial court correctly noted that the Hills I court would have been 
in the best position to enter sanctions against defendants. This would be the proper 
remedy, not collateral litigation. Similarly, if the Hills' claim for intentional interference 
with a cause of action were recognized, trial courts would be faced with the difficult task 
of reviewing a prior action and trying to determine whether the conduct was egregious or 
simply a party exercising its right to defend itself. Other jurisdictions' treatment of 
interference with a cause of action are similar to this Court's resolution of abuse of 
process claims in Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, }^53, 70 
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P.3d 17. In Bennett, this Court stated that the 
fact that certain consequences flowed from the [underlying] 
litigation or that the [underlying] litigation had some 
collateral negative effect on [plaintiff] such as expenditure of 
time and resources in defending the [underlying] or emotional 
strain or reputational damage as a result of the [underlying] 
litigation is not sufficient to state a cause of action for abuse 
of process. 
Id. 
V. THE HILLS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER WHICH PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES COULD BE AWARDED. 
The trial court correctly dismissed the Hills' claims for punitive damages. Under 
Utah law, punitive damages are available only if the plaintiff can uprove the defendant's 
conduct was willful and malicious, or manifested a knowing and reckless indifference and 
disregard toward the rights of others." See Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 
1988). Because the Hills failed to state a claim for any intentional tort that would warrant 
an award of intentional damages, the trial court properly dismissed those claims. 
The trial court correctly recognized this when it stated that although |it 
''understands that there are more parties and deeper pockets with three Defendants in the 
case at bar, rather than just one in Hills /, Plaintiffs' desire for punitive damages is an 
inadequate basis to allow punitive damages to stand alone. There must be a viable cause 
of action attached to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim." (R. 1235.) (Order at 12.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The Hills failed to state any claim under which relief could be granted, and the trial 
court properly dismissed the Hills II Complaint. This Court should affirm the trial court's 
dismissal with prejudice of the Hills II lawsuit. 
;3^a DATED this <££ day of April, 2009. 
Gary L. Johnson 
Zachary E. Peterson 
Tawni J. Anderson 
Attorneys for Liberty Mutual 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 2 2 _ _ day of April, 2009, to the following: 
Dennis R. James, Esq. 
Brian H. Hess, Esq. 
Morgan, Minnock, Rice, & James, LC 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
EDWARD P. MORIARTY 
BRADLEY L. BOOKE 
MORIARTY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE, LLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DANIEL J. DAVIS (admittedpro hac vice) 
JASON SCHWARTZ {admittedpro hac vice) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 
1801 California Street, Suite 4200 
Denver, CO 80202 ^ ^ 
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Edward P. Moriarity (5622) 
Jeffrey D. Gooch (7863) 
Bradley L. Booke (9984) 
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE, LLC 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-0811 
Facsimile: (801)521-0546 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ * ' 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS 
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of 
MARK D. HILLS (deceased); 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio 
Corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE CO., a Delaware Corporation; 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah 
Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, UPS, 
LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING 
COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts Mutual 
Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL 
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts 
Mutual Holding Company; and 
SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants 
COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
Judge: ^ VW-Se^ 
Case No. OSd^O ^ & Z 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their counsel, Moriarity, Gooch, 
Badaruddin & Booke, LLC, and hereby allege against the Defendants as follows: 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
Parties: 
1. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs are and have been residents of the 
State of Utah. 
2. Bruce Hills is the father of Mark D. Hills, now deceased. At all times 
relevant to this action, Bruce Hills was a resident of the State of Utah. 
3. Judith Hills is the mother of Mark D. Hills, now deceased. At all times 
relevant to this action, Judith Hills was a resident of the State of Utah. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc., was an Ohio 
Corporation located at 100 East Campus View Boulevard, Suite 300 
Columbus, Ohio 43235 and was duly chartered pursuant to the laws of the 
State of Utah, and was licensed to do business in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
5. At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendant UPSCO United Parcel Service Co., was a Delaware 
Corporation located at 55 Glenlake Parkway NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30328, 
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and was duly chartered pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, and was 
licensed to do business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc., was a Utah Corporation 
located at 2040 Parkway Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah, and was duly 
chartered pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, and was licensed to do 
business in Salt lake County, State of Utah. United Parcel Service, which 
is located at 2040 Parkway Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah, was the 
location, site, and origination point for many of the facts giving rise to this 
suit. This business entity does business as United Parcel Service and UPS. 
As such, plaintiffs have filed this action using the names of those business 
entities as they are used by the business itself as it holds itself out to the 
public. All of the above-named Defendants will hereinafter be referred to 
as UPS. 
At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendant Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., a 
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company, owns several stock insurance 
companies including but not limited to Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company; and a Company 
known as Liberty Mutual Managed Care, Inc., and although none of these 
above Companies are licensed to do business in Utah, except Liberty 
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Mutual Managed Care, Inc., all share the same corporate headquarters at 
175 Berkely Street; Boston, Massachusetts 02117. 
8. At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, a 
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company was not licensed to do business 
in Utah but had minimum contacts in Utah and in fact did business in Utah 
and holds itself out to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Utah 
and is duly chartered pursuant to the laws of the State of Massachusetts 
and has corporate headquarters at 175 Berkely Street; Boston, 
Massachusetts 02117. The above named Insurance Defendants, Liberty 
Mutual Holding Company, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company will hereinafter be referred to as "Liberty Mutual." 
9. At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendant Skyline Electric Company, located at 1875 West 
2300 South, West Valley City, Utah, was a Utah corporation duly 
chartered pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, and was licensed to do 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
10. At all times relevant hereto, all acts and omissions set forth herein against 
Defendants giving rise to this action were by employees and or agents of 
said Defendants and said employees and or agents were acting within the 
scope and course of their employment and or agency with the Defendants. 
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Jurisdiction and Venue: 
11. The amount in controversy in this matter exceeds that amount required for 
filing in the district courts in the State of Utah. 
12. Jurisdiction in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-
3-4(1996). 
13. The claims arose in this judicial district and all acts and omissions 
complained of occurred within this judicial district of the State of Utah. 
Consequently, this Court has proper venue. 
Factual Basis for Claims: 
14. On Tuesday, August 19, 2003, at approximately 4:20 A.M. an incident 
occurred at the United Parcel Service (UPS) facility, located at 2040 
Parkway Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah, wherein Mark D. Hills was 
electrocuted. 
15. Mark D. Hills, an employee of United Parcel Service, was 
electrocuted while working in and around a Mobile Distribution Unit 
(MDU) located at Door 141 at said UPS facility. 
16. A MDU is backed into the UPS building and has a conveyor belt running 
down the middle of it. 
17. The MDU has several doors on each side of it. 
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The UPS trucks back into these doors and the packages are fed into the 
trucks. 
The conveyor belt was located in the distribution-type trailer (MDU) that 
was located at Dock Door #141 of the United Parcel Service facility. 
The. MDU was being fed packages from the UPS facility conveyor 
system. 
A package fell beneath the conveyor chute and into a hole in the MDU. 
Mark D. Hills was attempting to retrieve a package that had fallen from a 
conveyor chute. 
Mark D. Hills laid down on the dock platform to pull the package from a 
lower level inside the distribution trailer. 
As Mark D. Hills contacted the metal frame of the distribution trailer and 
the building dock surface simultaneously, he became a grounding path 
since the building and trailer were "hot" and not properly grounded. 
Mark D. Hills was electrocuted. 
Mark D. Hills was transported by ambulance to Pioneer Valley 
Hospital where resuscitation efforts were preformed and he was 
pronounced dead. 
Prior to the electrocution of Mark D. Hills, Skyline Electric Company had 
performed many installation and maintenance projects for UPS including, 
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but not limited to, electrical work on light fixture, the docking structure, 
and the MDU units. 
28. On or about August 15, 2003, Skyline Electric Company reinstalled a light 
fixture in the MDU in which Mark D. Hills was electrocuted. 
29. Skyline Electric Company improperly installed, repaired and maintained 
the light fixture by failing to properly ground the equipment. 
30. Skyline Electric Company improperly installed the grounding wire. 
31. Skyline Electric Company utilized the wrong materials in its attempt to 
ground the fixtures, the MDU, and the UPS facility. 
32. After the electrocution of Mark D. Hills calls were made to the UPS 
Supervisors and they determined that action, contrary to law, be taken to 
examine the situation and determine what had occurred prior to calling in 
Utah OSHA and law enforcement personal. 
33. The Defendant UPS knew or should have known that they were required 
to secure the scene and to contact Utah OSHA prior to the changing of the 
scene or the removal and/or alteration of the scene, equipment, materials 
or other evidence. 
34. The Defendant prior to contacting Utah OSHA called to the scene the 
Defendant Liberty Mutual and the Defendant Skyline Electric Company 
and all of the Defendants acting in concert changed the scene and changed 
and/or removed and/or altered equipment, materials and other evidence. 
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35. The defendants willfully and intentionally and negligently removed and/or 
altered equipment, materials or other evidence pertaining to the cause of 
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
36. Equipment, materials and other evidence pertaining to the cause of the 
electrocution were removed and/or altered prior to the Defendants, 
and specifically UPS management personnel, reporting the incident to 
Utah OSHA and the Labor Commission or one of its Compliance 
Officers. 
37. The Defendants deliberately and knowingly failed to disclose to Utah 
OSHA and the Labor Commission or its Compliance Officers their 
actions dealing with the equipment, materials or other evidence 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
38. The Defendants deliberately and knowingly misrepresented their 
actions to Utah OSHA and the Labor Commission or its Compliance 
Officers dealing with the equipment, materials or other evidence 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
39. The Defendants deliberately and knowingly concealed their actions to 
Utah OSHA and the Labor Commission or its Compliance Officers 
dealing with the equipment, materials or other evidence pertaining to 
the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
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8. 
40. The Defendants deliberately and knowingly removed and/or altered 
equipment, materials or other evidence without authorization by Utah 
OSHA or the Labor Commission or one of its Compliance Officers 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
41. The Defendants were in violation of law by their acts and omissions 
dealing with the concealment, misrepresentation, and failure to 
disclose how they dealt with the equipment, materials or other 
evidence pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
42. The Defendant, United Parcel Service, acting in concert with 
Defendants Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, and Skyline 
Electric, deliberately and knowingly allowed their own employees, 
and representatives of the other defendants to remove and/or alter 
equipment, materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of 
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills without authorization by the Labor 
Commission or one of its Compliance Officers. 
43. The Defendant, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, acting in 
concert with the Defendants United Parcel Service, and Skyline 
Electric, deliberately and knowingly allowed their own employees, 
and representatives of the other defendants to remove and/or alter 
equipment, materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of 
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the electrocution of Mark D. Hills without authorization by the Labor 
Commission or one of its Compliance Officers. 
44. The Defendant, Skyline Electric Company, acting in concert with the 
Defendants United Parcel Service, and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company, deliberately and knowingly allowed their own employees, 
and representatives of the other defendants to remove and/or alter 
equipment, materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of 
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills without authorization by the Labor 
Commission or one of its Compliance Officers. 
45. The defendant, United Parcel Service, acting in concert with 
Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, deliberately and 
knowingly allowed Heath Engineering, a third party electrical 
engineering consultant, to remove and/or alter equipment, materials 
and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of an electrocution 
without authorization by the Labor Commission or one of its 
Compliance Officers. 
46. The defendant, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, acting in 
concert with Defendant United Parcel Service, deliberately and 
knowingly allowed Heath Engineering, a third party electrical 
engineering consultant, to remove and/or alter equipment, materials 
and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of an electrocution 
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without authorization by the Labor Commission or one of its 
Compliance Officers. 
47. On Tuesday, August 19, 2003, UPS management personnel was 
instructed by a Utah OSHA Compliance Officer to hold the MDU and 
associated equipment, in that it was to be sealed and isolated from any 
contact or activity until further authorization by the Compliance 
Officer. 
48. Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company acting with the 
advice and consent of Defendant UPS authorized the contact and 
hiring of Heath Engineering to investigate the scene even though they 
were aware or should have been aware of the order and instruction of 
the Utah OSHA Compliance Supervisor to UPS management 
personnel to seal the scene and no to tamper with the equipment, 
materials and other evidence until it had been officially released by 
Utah OSHA. 
49. On the morning of Wednesday, August 20, 2003, Defendant UPS 
management personnel, acting in concert with Defendant Liberty 
Mutual Fire Insurance Company allowed and directed Heath 
Engineering to conduct an investigation of the MDU without such 
authorization by the Compliance Officer. 
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50. The investigation resulted in the removal and/or alteration of 
equipment; materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of 
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
51. The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were 
willful, intentional, negligent acts and omissions that resulted in the 
changing of the scene, and materials and equipment and other 
evidence being negligently removed and/or altered. 
52. The defendants had knowledge of said acts and omissions and willfully 
and intentionally misled the lawful investigators of these facts and failed 
to disclose said facts to the lawful investigators even when asked. 
53. The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were 
engaged in for the purpose of covering up the true facts and 
circumstances that led to the wrongful death of Mark D. Hills. 
54. The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were 
engaged in to prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against 
the defendants including any third party actions and any actions for 
spoilage of evidence and the above acts and omissions were engaged 
in for the purpose of hindering said litigation. 
55. As a direct and proximate cause and result of said acts and omissions, 
Mark D. Hills died and the Plaintiffs suffered damages as set forth more 
fully in the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages." 
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12. 
First Claim For Relief: Negligence 
56. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations 
contained in paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 
57. At all relevant times, Defendant United Parcel Service had exclusive 
custody and control of the premises at which the incident occurred, and 
the material evidence attendant thereto. 
58. At all relevant times, it was foreseeable that legal action, including but not 
limited to the prosecution of Plaintiffs' legal claims, would arise out of the 
circumstances surrounding the death of Mark Hills. 
59. All Defendants, including Defendant United Parcel Service, were under a 
directive and obligation from Utah OSHA, the Utah Labor Commissioner, 
and applicable law to preserve the premises and material evidence and to 
protect it against harm, destruction, or other spoliation. 
60. Pursuant to the directives from Utah OSHA, The Utah Labor Commission, 
and applicable law, and all attendant circumstances as set forth above, the 
Defendants committed themselves to the performance of an undertaking, 
to wit, the preservation of the premises and material evidence attendant to 
the death of Mark Hills and to protect it against harm, destruction, or other 
spoliation. 
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61. In so committing themselves to the performance of such an undertaking 
the Defendants assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of 
Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, the protection of evidence 
necessary for the prosecution of any of Plaintiffs, legal claims for relief 
arising out of the death of Mark Hills. 
62. The Defendants, acting by and through their agents and employees, owed 
duties of care to the Plaintiffs' decedent, Mark D. Hills, and to the 
Plaintiffs to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
63. The Defendants owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and others who would be in 
his stead to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
64. The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others 
to provide adequate training and supervision to its employees and agents 
to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to 
the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
65. The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others 
to make and implement and enforce policies and procedures to ensure that 
the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to the cause of 
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills was not disturbed. 
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66. By its acts and omissions as described herein the Defendants by and 
through the acts and omissions of its employees and or agents, breached 
the duties described above, thereby directly and proximately causing the 
cover-up and spoliation of evidence and tortiously interfered with the 
Plaintiffs right to bring Causes of Action resulting from the wrongful 
death of Mark D. Hills. 
67. The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were 
engaged in to prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against 
the defendants including any third party actions and any actions for 
spoilage of evidence and the above acts and omissions were engaged 
in for the purpose of hindering said litigation. 
68. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, the 
Plaintiffs have suffered damages, as more specifically set forth below in 
the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages." 
Second Claim For Relief: Intentional Misconduct 
69. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations 
contained in paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 
70. At all relevant times, Defendant United Parcel Service had exclusive 
custody and control of the premises at which the incident occurred, and 
the material evidence attendant thereto. 
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At all relevant times, it was foreseeable that legal action, including but not 
limited to the prosecution of Plaintiffs, legal claims, would arise out of the 
circumstances surrounding the death of Mark Hills. 
All Defendants, including Defendant United Parcel Service, were under a 
directive and obligation from Utah OSHA, the Utah Labor Commissioner, 
and applicable law to preserve the premises and material evidence and to 
protect it against harm, destruction, or other spoliation. 
Pursuant to the directives from Utah OSHA, The Utah labor Commission, 
and applicable law, and all attendant circumstances as set forth above, the 
Defendants committed themselves to the performance of an undertaking, 
to wit, the preservation of the premises and material evidence attendant to 
the death of Mark Hills and to protect it against harm, destruction, or other 
spoliation. 
In so committing themselves to the performance of such an undertaking 
the Defendants assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of 
Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, the protection of evidence 
necessary for the prosecution of any of Plaintiffs, legal claims for relief 
arising out of the death of Mark Hills. 
The Defendants, acting by and through their agents and employees, owed 
duties of care to the Plaintiffs' decedent, Mark D. Hills, and to the 
16. 
000016 
Plaintiffs to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
76. The Defendants owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and others who would be in 
his stead to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
77. The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others 
to provide adequate training and supervision to its employees and agents 
to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to 
the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
78. The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others 
to make and implement and enforce policies and procedures to ensure that 
the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to the cause of 
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills was not disturbed. 
79. By its acts and omissions as described herein the Defendants by and 
through the acts and omissions of its employees and or agents, 
intentionally, willfully and deliberately breached the duties described 
above, thereby directly and proximately causing the cover-up and 
spoliation of evidence and tortious ly interfered with the Plaintiffs right to 
bring Causes of Action resulting from the wrongful death of Mark D. 
Hills. 
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The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were 
intentionally, willfully and deliberately engaged in to prevent the 
Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the defendants including 
any third party actions and any actions for spoilage of evidence and 
the above acts and omissions were engaged in for the purpose of 
hindering said litigation. 
As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, the 
Plaintiffs have suffered damages, as more specifically set forth below in 
the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages." 
Second Claim For Relief: Tortious Interference 
Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations 
contained in paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 
At all relevant times, Defendant United Parcel Service had exclusive 
custody and control of the premises at which the incident occurred, and 
the material evidence attendant thereto. 
At all relevant times, it was foreseeable that legal action, including but not 
limited to the prosecution of Plaintiffs, legal claims, would arise out of the 
circumstances surrounding the death of Mark Hills. 
All Defendants, including Defendant United Parcel Service, were under a 
directive and obligation from Utah OS HA, the Utah Labor Commissioner, 
18. 
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and applicable law to preserve the premises and material evidence and to 
protect it against harm, destruction, or other spoliation. 
86. Pursuant to the directives from Utah OSHA, The Utah labor Commission, 
and applicable law, and all attendant circumstances as set forth above, the 
Defendants committed themselves to the performance of an undertaking, 
to wit, the preservation of the premises and material evidence attendant to 
the death of Mark Hills and to protect it against harm, destruction, or other 
spoliation. 
87. In so committing themselves to the performance of such an undertaking 
the Defendants assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of 
Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, the protection of evidence 
necessary for the prosecution of any of Plaintiffs, legal claims for relief 
arising out of the death of Mark Hills. 
88. The Defendants, acting by and through their agents and employees, owed 
duties of care to the Plaintiffs' decedent, Mark D. Hills, and to the 
Plaintiffs to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
89. The Defendants owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and others who would be in 
his stead to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence 
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
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90. The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others 
to provide adequate training and supervision to its employees and agents 
to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to 
the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills. 
91. The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others 
to make and implement and enforce policies and procedures to ensure that 
the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to the cause of 
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills was not disturbed. 
92. By its acts and omissions as described herein the Defendants by and 
through the acts and omissions of its employees and or agents, negligently, 
intentionally, willfully and deliberately breached the duties described 
above, thereby directly and proximately causing the cover-up and 
spoliation of evidence and tortious interference with the Plaintiffs right to 
bring Causes of Action resulting from the wrongful death of Mark D. 
Hills. 
93. The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were 
negligently, intentionally, willfully and deliberately engaged in to 
prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the defendants 
including any third party actions and any actions for spoilage of 
evidence and the above acts and omissions were engaged in for the 
20. 
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purpose of hindering said litigation and for the purpose of tortiously 
interfering with said causes of action. 
94. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, the 
Plaintiffs have suffered damages, as more specifically set forth below in 
the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages." 
DAMAGES 
95. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations 
contained in all prior paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
96. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants, 
Plaintiffs were injured and Plaintiffs have incurred the following damages: 
a) The loss of care, comfort, and society of Mark D. Hills; 
b) Burial expenses and funeral expenses for Mark D. Hills; 
c) Past and future emotional pain and suffering; 
d) Past medical expenses;* 
e) Past and future loss of enjoyment of life; 
f) Loss of earnings and earning capacity; 
g) Past special damages; 
h) Punitive Damages; 
i) Past and future general damages; 
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j) Damages resulting from tortuous interference with a legal cause of 
action; and 
k) Damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause of action. 
1) Any damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment, order and decree of this Court as follows: 
a) That judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant. 
b) That Plaintiffs be awarded all damages that are fair and just, in an amount 
supported by the allegations in this Compliant and the evidence adduced at trial, 
including pre and post judgment interest. 
c) That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs of suit incurred herein. 
d) That Plaintiffs be awarded all other and further relief as the Court deems 
proper. 
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DATED this 16th day of August, 2005. 
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & 
BOOKE, LLC 
Edvtatd^ 
Jeffrey 
Bradley L. Booke 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-0811 
Facsimile: (801)521-0546 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 
Plaintiffs demand that a jury hear and decide the above issues and allegations. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 2005. 
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & 
BOOKE, LLC 
Edward P. M»riarity 
D. Good; 
Bradley L. Booke 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-0811 
Facsimile: (801) 521-0546 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Edward P. Moriarity (5622) 
Jeffrey D. Gooch (7863) 
Bradley L. Booke (9984) 
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE, LLC 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-0811 
Facsimile: (801)521-0546 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DIVISION, STATE OF 
UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS 
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of 
MARK D. HILLS (deceased); 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation 
Defendant. 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their counsel, Moriarity, Gooch, 
Badaruddin & Booke, LLC, and hereby allege against the Defendant as follows: 
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FILER msnxQj 
COMPLAINT AM) 
DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
Judge: 
Case No. <_ 
0 Yo/or^s-
FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. Parties and Non-Parties: 
1. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs are and have been residents of the 
State of Utah. 
2. Bruce Hills is the father of Mark D. Hills, now deceased. At all times 
relevant to this action, Bruce Hills was a resident of the State of Utah. 
3. Judith Hills is the mother of Mark D. Hills, now deceased. At all times 
relevant to this action, Judith Hills was a resident of the State of Utah. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendant Skyline Electric Company, 1875 West 2300 South, 
West Valley City, Utah, was a Utah corporation duly chartered pursuant to 
the laws of the State of Utah, and was licensed to do business in Salt lake 
County, State of Utah. 
5. At all times relevant hereto, all acts and omissions set forth herein against 
Defendant Skyline Electric Company giving rise to this action were by 
employees and or agents of said Defendant and said employees and or 
agents were acting within the scope and course of their employment and or 
agency with the Defendant Skyline Electric Company. 
B. Jurisdiction and Venue: 
6. The amount in controversy in this matter exceeds that amount required for 
filing in the district courts in the State of Utah. 
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7. Jurisdiction in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-
3-4(1996). 
8. The claims arose in this judicial district and all acts and omissions 
complained of occurred within this judicial district of the State of Utah. 
Consequently, this Court has proper venue. 
C. Factual Basis for Claims: 
9. On Tuesday, August 19, 2003, at approximately 4:20 A.M. an incident 
occurred at the United Parcel Service (UPS) facility, located at 2040 
Parkway Boulevard, wherein Mark D. Hills was electrocuted. 
10. Mark D. Hills, an employee of United Parcel Service, was 
electrocuted while working in and around a Mobile Distribution Unit 
(MDU) located at Door 141 at said UPS facility. 
11. A MDU is backed into the UPS building and has a conveyor belt running 
down the middle of it. 
12. The MDU has several doors on each side of it 
13. The UPS trucks back into these doors and the packages are fed into the 
trucks. 
14. The conveyor belt was located in the distribution-type trailer (MDU) that 
was located at Dock Door #141 of the United Parcel Service facility. 
15. The MDU was being fed packages from the UPS facility conveyor 
system. 
16. A package fell beneath the conveyor chute and into a hole in the MDU. 
17. Mark D. Hills was attempting to retrieve a package that had fallen from a 
conveyor chute. 
18. Mark D. Hills laid down on the dock platform to pull the package from a 
lower level inside the distribution trailer. 
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19. As Mark D. Hills contacted the metal frame of the distribution trailer and 
the building dock surface simultaneously, he became a grounding path 
since the building and trailer were "hot" and not properly grounded. 
20. Mark D. Hills was electrocuted. 
21. Other employees in the area called Rescue sendees which were called 
to the facility. 
22. Mr. Hills was transported by ambulance to Pioneer Valley Hospital 
where resuscitation efforts were preformed and he was pronounced dead. 
23. Prior to the electrocution of Mark D. Hills, Skyline Electric Company had 
performed many installation and maintenance projects for UPS including, 
but not limited to, electrical work on the docking structure and the MDU 
units. 
24. On or about August 15, 2003, Skyline Electric Company reinstalled a light 
fixture in the MDU. 
25. Skyline Electric Company improperly installed, repaired and maintained 
the light fixture by failing to properly ground the equipment. 
26. Skyline Electric Company improperly installed the grounding wire. 
27. Skyline Electric Company utilized the wrong materials in its attempt to 
ground the fixtures, the MDU, and the UPS facility. 
28. The employee of Skyline Electric Company, who worked on the light 
fixture, was Justin Bright 
29. All acts and omissions of the Defendant Skyline Electric Company were 
by and tlirough its employees and/or agents acting within the scope of 
their employment or agency. 
30. As a result of the negligent acts and omissions of the Defendant Skyline 
Electric Company and its employees and/or agents for which Defendant 
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Skyline Electric Company is vicariously liable, Mark D. Hills was 
electrocuted. 
31. As a direct and proximate cause and result of said acts and omissions, 
Mark D. Hills died and the Plaintiffs suffered damages as set forth more 
fully in the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages." 
First Claim For Relief: Negligence 
32. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations 
contained in paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 
33. Defendant Skyline Electric Company, acting by and through its agents and 
employees, owed duties of care to the Plaintiffs5 decedent, Mark D. Hills, 
and to the Plaintiffs to perform its work in a reasonable, safe and proper 
manner, utilize the proper materials, and to render its services with 
reasonable care, especially when dealing with electricity. 
34. Defendant Skyline Electric Company owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and 
others who would be around the buildings and vehicles upon which they 
performed electrical services including repair, maintenance, and 
installation. 
35. Defendant Skyline Electric Company owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and 
others to provide adequate training and supervision to its employees and 
agents for all normal and expected duties in the electrical service area. 
5. 
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36. Defendant Skyline Electric Company owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and 
others to provide adequate tools and materials so its employees and agents 
could safely provide proper services. 
37. Defendant Skyline Electric Company owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and 
others to implement and enforce policies and procedures to ensure the safe 
operation of its electrical service. 
38. By its acts and omissions as described above, Defendant Skyline 
Electrical Company, by and through the acts and omissions of its 
employees and or agents, breached the duties described above, thereby 
directly and proximately causing the wrongful death of Mark D. Hills. 
39. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, 
Mark D. Hills was electrocuted and the Plaintiffs have suffered damages, 
as more specifically set forth below in the section of this Complaint 
entitled "Damages." 
DAMAGES 
40. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations 
contained in all prior paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
41. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant, 
Plaintiffs were injured and Plaintiffs have incurred the following damages: 
a) The loss of care, comfort, and society of Mark D. Hills; 
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b) Burial expenses and funeral expenses for Mark D. Hills; 
c) Past and future emotional pain and suffering; 
d) Past medical expenses; 
e) Past and future loss of enjoyment of life; 
f) Loss of earnings and earning capacity; 
g) Past special damages; and 
h) Past and future general damages. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that judgment, order and decree of this Court be as 
follows: 
a) That judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant 
b) That Plaintiffs be awarded all damages that are fair and just, in an amount 
supported by the allegations in this Compliant and the evidence adduced at trial, 
including pre and post judgment interest, 
c) That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs of suit incurred herein. 
d) That Plaintiffs be awarded all other and further relief as the Court deems 
proper. 
DATED this _ i _ l day of October, 2004. 
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MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & 
BOOKE, LLC 
Mbriarity (5622) 
reySTGSgch (7863) 
Bradley L. Booke (9984) 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-0811 
Facsimile: (801) 521-0546 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 
Plaintiffs demand that a jury hear and decide the above issues and allegations. 
DATED this / V day of October, 2004. 
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & 
BOOKE, LLC 
( 
Jv^rd^Moriarity (5622) 
Je t f reyrr tWh (7863) 
Bradley L. Booke (9984) 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-0811 
Facsimile: (801) 521-0546 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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KiraM. Slawson(7081) 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, PC 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-7900 
Facsimile: (801) 521-7965 
Taggart Hansen (admitted pro hac vice) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 
1801 California Street, Suite 4200 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Telephone: (303) 298-5700 
Facsimile: (303)313-2857 
Attorneys for United Parcel Service Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DIVISION STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS 
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of 
MARK D. HILLS (deceased); 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio 
corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE CO., a Delaware corporation 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah 
corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING 
COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts Mutual 
Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts 
Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE 
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS 
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of 
MARK D. HILLS (deceased^: 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
[111Will QEimj ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION 
TO DISMISS BASED ON MOOTNESS 
Civil No. 1:050407708 
Judge Terry Christiansen 
Civil No. 1:040107128 
Judge Stephen Roth 
00 
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Defendant. 
Defendant United Parcel Service Inc. ("UPS") filed a renewed motion to dismiss the 
claims asserted by plaintiffs Bruce Hills and Judith Hills ("Plaintiffs") in the case of Hills v. 
United Parcel Service Inc, et al, Civil No. 1:050407708 (Christiansen, J.) ^ Hills //"). 
Defendants Liberty Mutual and Skyline Electric Co. filed motions joining in UPS's renewed 
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and UPS filed a reply brief. UPS's renewed 
motion to dismiss was submitted for decision, and a hearing was held on March 31, 2008, at 
which counsel for UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Plaintiffs appeared and presented oral argument. 
Having considered UPS's renewed motion to dismiss, the opposition thereto, oral argument, and 
the record in this case, it is hereby: 
ORDERED that Skyline's Cross-Claims asserted against UPS in Hills II be, and hereby 
are, DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief—Negligence asserted in Hills II be, and 
hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief—Intentional Misconduct asserted in 
Hills //be, and hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent such a claim seeks damages 
identified in Paragraphs 96(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint 
.and Demand for Jury Trial ("Hills //Complaint"). Plaintiffs can continue to seek from Skyline 
Electric Co. through the Hills I litigation the damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), 
(d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint. Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief is not 
dismissed to the extent it seeks damages identified in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). Pending 
supplemental briefing, the Court reserves its decision on whether the remaining aspects of 
Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief should be dismissed. It is further 
1 
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ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief—Tortious Interference asserted in 
Hills //be, and hereby is DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent such a claim seeks damages 
identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint. 
Plaintiffs can continue to seek from Skyline Electric Co. through the Hills I litigation the 
damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills II 
Complaint. Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief in Hills II is not dismissed to the extent it seeks 
damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (h), (j), (k), and (1). Pending supplemental briefing, the 
Court reserves its decision on whether the remaining aspects of Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief 
should be dismissed. It is further 
ORDERED that UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Plaintiffs shall submit supplemental briefing 
on whether, given Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint and Skyline Electric Co.'s admission of liability 
in Hills v Skyline Electric Co , Civil No. 1:040107128 (Roth, J.), Plaintiffs Second and Third 
Claims for Relief remain viable such that Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover through the 
Hills //case the damages asserted in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). UPS's and Liberty 
Mutual's respective supplemental opening briefs shall be due on or before May 1, 2008, limited 
to 10 pages. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(2). Plaintiffs' supplemental responsive brief shall be due 
on or before June 1, 2008, limited to 10 pages. Id UPS's and Liberty Mutual's respective 
supplemental reply briefs shall be due on or before June 15, 2008, limited to 5 pages. Id, 
DATED this JZ^ day of ^3OYVJI , 2008. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST JORDAN DIVISION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of May, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER NO, 1 RE DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO 
DISMISS BASED ON MOOTNESS to be sent via U.S. Mail and E-mail to the following: 
Stephen P. Morgan, Esq. 
Dennis R. James, Esq. 
Sara N. Becker, Esq. 
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES, L.C. 
136 South Main Street 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant Skyline Electric Co. 
Edward Moriarity 
Jacque Ramos 
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE 
8 East Broadway, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Gary Johnson 
Zachary Peterson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Wells Fargo Center 
299 So. Main Street, 15th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Liberty Mutual 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS, 
individually, and as natural parents and heirs 
of MARK D. HILLS (deceased), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio 
corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE CO., a Delaware corporation; 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah 
corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL 
HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a 
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company; 
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Massachusetts Mutual 
Holding Company; and SKYLINE 
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' 
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 050407708 
Judge Terry L. Christiansen 
This matter came before the Court on September 3, 2008, for hearing on Defendants United 
Parcel Service Inc., UPSCO United Parcel Service Co., and United Parcel Service Inc., (collectively 
referred to as "UPS") Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims. Edward P. Mortality and 
Bradley L. Booke, appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, Jason Schwartz, Daniel Davis, Taggart Hansen 
and Kira M Slawson appeared on behalf of UPS, Dennis R. James appeared on behalf of Liberty 
Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc. (collectively referred 
to as "Liberty Mutual") and Gary L. Johnson appeared on behalf of Skyline Electrical Company 
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("Skyline"). Having considered the parties arguments, supplemental briefs, the applicable law, and 
the record in this case, the Court issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order: 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs are the parents of a former UPS employee, Mark D. Hills, who died in an 
electrical accident while performing his work in August 2003. Plaintiffs filed Hills v. Skyline 
Electric Co., civil no. 040107125 (Roth, J.) ("Hills I") in October 2004, against Skyline alleging 
that its negligence caused the death of their son. 
While engaged in discovery in Hills /, Plaintiffs filed this law suit, known as Hills II, in 
September 2005, alleging that Defendants negligently and intentionally spoliated evidence in 
connection with the electrocution of Mark D. Hills and intentionally hindered the Hills I 
litigation. See Hills II Complaint dated August 16, 2005, fflf 32-55 and 69-94. Plaintiffs alleged 
Defendant's conduct proximately caused them damages and sought punitive damages, damages 
resulting from tortuous interference with a legal cause of action, damages resulting from 
hindrance with a lawful cause of action and any other damages.1 See id at f 96(h), (j), (k), and 
(i). 
Skyline answered Plaintiffs complaint and filed cross claims against UPS. UPS and 
Liberty Mutual filed motions to dismiss both Plaintiffs complaint and Skyline's cross claims. 
The Court initially stayed ruling on UPS and Liberty Mutuals' motions to dismiss 
pending resolution of Hills /because (1) the discovery for Hills land Hills II had been 
consolidated and would permit the parties to determine exactly what occurred that caused the 
1
 Other damages were also claimed, but these were dismissed pursuant to the Court's 
June 12, 2008 Order. 
2 001225 
electrocution death of Mark D. Hills and what changes were made and by whom to the scene of 
the accident which constitute the "spoliation of evidence"claim; (2) the issue of whether Utah 
courts recognize the tort of "spoliation of evidence" has not been determined and (3) it is 
necessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case 
in Hills /before determining that such inability was due to "spoliated evience." 
After three years of discovery, Skyline amended their answer in Hills I to admit liability, 
but still dispute the damages alleged by Plaintiffs. Thereafter, UPS renewed its motion to 
dismiss in this case, Hills II, and Liberty Mutual and Skyline joined in the motion. The Court 
granted UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Skyline's cross claim and granted in part and reserved 
in part UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in an Order dated June 12, 2008. 
Liberty Mutual and Skyline filed motions to join UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs 
filed an opposition and UPS filed a reply, which was joined by Liberty Mutual and Skyline. 
A hearing on the motion was held on March 31, 2008, wherein Plaintiffs, UPS, Liberty 
Mutual and Skyline appeared and presented oral argument. The Court ruled on a majority of the 
issues in an order dated June 12, 2008. In that Order, the Court reserved decision on Plaintiffs' 
Second and Third Claims for Relief to the extent those claims sought damages identified in 
Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). Plaintiffs' second claim for relief is intentional misconduct 
and the third claim for relief is tortuous interference. Both of these claims appear to be 
intentional spoliation of evidence claims and at the hearing sounded like abuse of process claims. 
The damages claims related to these claims for purposes of this motion are in Paragraph 96, 
subsections (h) Punitive damages; (j) Damages resulting from tortuous interference with a legal 
cause of action; (k) Damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause of action and (1) Any 
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damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
The Court requested supplemental briefs on whether, given Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint 
and Skyline Electric Company's admission of liability in Hills /, Plaintiffs Second and Third 
Claims for Relief remain viable after Skyline's admission of liability in Hills I such that 
Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover through this case the damages asserted in Paragraphs 
96(h), (j)i (k), and (1). Plaintiffs, UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline have filed supplemental briefs 
on the issue. A hearing was held on September 3, 2008. 
SKYLINE ELECTRIC AND LIBERTY MUTUAL'S MOTIONS TO JOIN 
IN UPS5 RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS 
Before addressing UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the Court will first address a matter 
raised by Liberty Mutual and Skyline. Apparently, there was some confusion on the application 
of the June 12, 2008 Order to Skyline and Liberty Mutual. UPS' renewed motion to dismiss was 
filed by the UPS defendants. The other defendants, Liberty Mutual and Skyline, filed motions to 
join UPS' renewed motion to dismiss. Liberty Mutual is UPS' workman's compensation 
insurance carrier. Skyline is the electric company that performed the electrical work at UPS' 
work site where the death of Mr. Hills occurred. Plaintiffs did not oppose Liberty Mutual and 
Skyline's motions to join. To avoid misunderstanding and to clarify application of the June 12, 
2008 Order, the language of the Court's June 12, 2008 Order clearly reflect that Liberty Mutual 
and Skyline were included in that Order. 
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LAW 
A court may dismiss a case if the party fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under subdivision (b)(6) admits the facts 
alleged in the complaint, but challenges Plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). All reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the facts should be made in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. 
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). A complaint is required to give the opposing party 
fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved, or it is subject to dismissal under subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. 
Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (1970). 
I 
INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs claim that although specific torts entitled "intentional misconduct" or "tortuous 
interference" do not exist in Utah, the substance of these claims constitute acts of intentional 
interference. Intentional interference is a tort that has been acknowledged by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Plaintiffs argue that although intentional interference is often associated with business 
relations, intentional interference within the context of harm to prospective economic relations 
creates the logical foundation for spoliation claims. Plaintiffs argue that the role and impact of 
UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline's (collectively referred to as "Defendants") intentional 
interference with evidence and the investigation pertaining to Mr. Hills' death in Hills /remains 
to be seen.2 In Hills /, Skyline still denies any damages. Plaintiffs argue that if they are unable to 
2
 The Court notes that at the March 31, 2008 hearing, Plaintiffs made arguments based 
upon facts and a new theory that were not in the Complaint and Demand for jury trial. Plaintiffs 
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prove damages or damages are seriously impaired Plaintiffs5 interference with a legal remedy 
claim remains viable. Plaintiffs argue that these proceedings have impacted Plaintiffs' 
expectancy in Hills I and Defendants cannot claim a legal "right" to inject such deceit into a 
lawsuit. 
As acknowledged by Plaintiffs, '"'intentional misconduct" or "tortuous interference" 
claims do not exist in Utah. Plaintiffs argue that the Utah Supreme Court has recognized these 
torts as plead by Plaintiffs. The Court disagrees. While the tort of intentional interference with 
economic relations has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Leigh Funiture and 
Carpet Co. V. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982), it is a big leap to jump from economic 
relations to spoliation of evidence. Nevertheless, the label is unimportant, and the substance of 
argued that these facts were included in the Complaint, however, the Court disagrees. These 
additional facts relate to a long chain of legal events that ensued after Mr. Hills death. Plaintiffs 
argue that the issue of how Defendants' malfeasance resulted in a chain of unnecessary legal 
proceedings by increasing the costs of suit or, in that matter, even necessitating a full blown law 
suit is still an issue. 
From reviewing the facts in the Complaint and those additional facts in the briefs and 
even viewing those facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court is not persuaded that 
Defendants did anything more than defend their respective interests and participate in the legal 
process. Wrongful death cases, by their very nature are cases that generally do not resolve 
quickly. Any claim for damages relating to a delay should be decided in the damages portion of 
Hills /, not here, an independent law suit for intentional spoliation. If Defendants had hindered 
or delayed for an improper purpose, this Court would expect to see motions to compel and 
motions for sanctions in Hills L However, no such motions have been filed in Hills L Moreover, 
Plaintiffs may have been premature in filing the present law suit because the litigation in Hills I 
had not concluded and there was no way to determine whether the acts of Defendants had 
affected the value of Plaintiffs claims in Hills I. This case was stayed even before deciding a 
motion to dismiss in part because it was "necessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine 
whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case in Hills /before determining that such inability 
was due to 'spoliated evience.'" Nevertheless, these additional facts and new theory are 
improperly raised in response to a motion to dismiss a complaint that does not include them. 
Therefore, the Court refrains from making a ruling on these arguments. 
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the actions is what concerns this Court. Plaintiffs appear to be claiming an independent tort of 
intentional spoliation of evidence.3 
Spoliation can be traced back to an ancient Latin phrase: Contra Spoliatorem Omnia 
Praesumuntur, which literally means all things presumed against the destroyer. The concept of 
punishing those who interfere with the legal rights of another has been around in some form for 
centuries. Such punishment includes: the adverse inference jury instruction that declares the 
destruction of relevant evidence gives rise to an inference that the thing which has been destroyed 
or mutilated would have been unfavorable to the position of the party responsible for the 
spoliation; discovery sanctions that may include dismissal of a case; and statutory criminal 
prosecution. 
In 1984, the concept of spoliation of evidence as an independent tort was conceived. 
California was the first state to adopt spoliation as an independent cause of action in a first party 
case, Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). However, 
California has since retreated from its earlier decision to recognize spoliation as an independent 
tort, see Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. \99S)(refusing 
to acknowledge an independent tort of intentional first-party spoliation and rejecting the Smith 
court's acceptance of the tort) and the Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 
223, 233 (Cal. \999){r ejecting an independent tort of third party spoliation). 
3
 Defendants argue that the Court's dismissal of the negligent spoliation of evidence 
claim should result in the dismissal of these "identical claims." The Court disagrees that the 
claims are identical. There is a difference between a negligent and intentional tort. The state of 
mind for each is different, therefore, the dismissal of the negligent tort does not necessarily 
preclude the intentional tort. 
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Neither the intentional nor the negligent spoliation of pvidence as an independent tort has 
been adopted in Utah.4 The single case substantively addressing an area of the spoliation of 
evidence doctrine by name is Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (UT App. 
1994). In Burns, a product liability case, the trial court granted summary judgment because 
Plaintiff could not show the bicycle at issue was defective. Plaintiff claimed that he could not 
provide proof because Defendant had destroyed the evidence of the defect and requested there be 
an evidentiary inference against Defendant that the bike was defective. The trial court refused 
Plaintiffs request. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "While Burns cites no authority 
demonstrating that Utah has adopted the spoliation doctrine, we conclude that it would not apply 
to the facts of this case in any event." Id. The Court concluded that the requirements for 
establishing an evidentiary inference based on spoliation had not been met because Defendants 
were not and could not have been on notice of Burns contemplation to sue and there was no 
independent duty to retain the allegedly defective part. 
The limited area of the spoliation of evidence doctrine cited by the Burns Court applied to 
a negligent first party and the remedy sought was an evidentiary inference. In this case, Plaintiffs 
filed an independent tort action for the intentional spoliation of the evidence against Defendants, 
first party Skyline and third parties UPS and Liberty Mutual, and the remedy sought is damages. 
For a doctrine that has not been adopted in Utah, this is a great leap from a negligent first party 
and the remedy of an adverse inference to an independent tort for intentional spoliation of the 
evidence and a remedy of damages. 
4
 The single Utah Supreme Court case citing the spoliation of evidence doctrine, State v. 
Seventy-Three Thousand One Hundred Thirty Dollars, 2001 UT 67, does no more than name the 
doctrine because the Court resolved the case on another ground for the appeal. 
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The spoliation of evidence doctrine has been discussed and sparingly applied in various 
forms throughout the United States.5 There appears to be a national debate on whether spoliation 
of the evidence should be an independent tort and if so, what acts should trigger the tort 
(negligent, intentional or both), what type of evidence should it extend to (limited to physical 
evidence or include all evidence), who should the tort extend to (first parties, third parties or 
both), and what should the remedy be (adverse inference, sanctions, dismissal, maximum 
damages, or a combination thereof).6 Surprisingly, Utah has not entered into the fray of this 
national debate. Since the spoliation of evidence doctrine has not been adopted in Utah in any 
form, this Court does not have a set rule or factors to apply to the parties to determine whether 
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
General tort law requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff 
damages. To prove a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff damages in a spoliation of evidence 
claim Plaintiff must show that: "(1) plaintiff pursued the initial civil action, and was unsuccessful 
because of the absence of the destroyed evidence, or at the very least, that the destruction of the 
evidence in question made pursuing the initial claim impossible; and (2) that the destroyed 
US LAW Network, Inc., USLAW Spoliation of Evidence Compendium (2005), 
http://uslawnetwork.org/files/public/Spoliation Compendium.pdf provides a brief summary of 
the spoliation law in each of the states. 
6
 For additional information on the national debate relating to spoliation of evidence as 
an independent tort and the application of the doctrine there are various sources to refer. See 
Rachel L. Sykes, Comment, A Phantom Menace: Spoliation of Evidence in Idaho Civil Cases, 42 
Idaho L. Rev. 821 (2006); Stefan Rubin, Note, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its 
Independent Tort for the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 345 (April 1999); Honorable 
Margaret O'Mara Frossard et al., Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois: The Law After Boyd v. 
Traveler's Insurance Co., 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 685 (Summer 1997); Ariel Porat et al., Liability 
for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891 (July 1997). 
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evidence would have enabled plaintiff successfully to pursue the initial civil action." Nix v. 
Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. D.C. 2001). Rather than try to predict whether the Utah Supreme 
Court would adopt the spoliation of evidence doctrine, and in what circumstances such doctrine 
would apply and what factors of the spoliation of evidence doctrine they would adopt, this Court 
will adopt and apply the foregoing two factor analysis in making its decision. 
UPS and Liberty Mutual are third party defendants in the context of Plaintiffs' intentional 
spoliation of evidence claim. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, they were 
having difficulty proving that Skyline's wrongful acts caused Mr. Hills death because of UPS and 
Liberty Mutual's acts. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Skyline's 
recent admission of liability in Hills /clearly establishes that Plaintiffs are successful in the 
proving liability in Hills L Plaintiffs seek "punitive damages," "damages resulting from tortuous 
interference with a legal cause of action," "damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause 
of action" and "any damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance with the laws 
of the state of Utah." Any spoliation of evidence by UPS and Liberty Mutual relates to proving 
liability, not damages. Because liability is no longer an issue in Hills I, Plaintiffs' legal remedy 
is not affected by UPS and Liberty Mutual's actions. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs 
intentional spoliation of evidence claim fails because Plaintiffs cannot show damages caused by 
UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts. 
As to Plaintiffs argument that their claim against UPS and Liberty Mutual is viable until 
after the damages are determined in Hills /, the Court disagrees. Mr. Hill's death is not disputed. 
Plaintiffs damages for Mr. Hill's wrongful death were fixed at the moment of Mr. Hill's death. 
Nothing the Defendants' did after Mr. Hill's death could affect the value of Plaintiffs damages 
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for his wrongful death. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants actions affected Plaintiffs probable 
expectancy in damages, a valuable property right. Defendants could not alter Plaintiffs probable 
expectancy in damages. Evidence of damages were frozen at the time of Mr. Hill's death. 
Whatever damages Plaintiffs are entitled to receive for Mr. Hill's wrongful death will be 
determined in the Hills I case between Plaintiffs and Skyline. All viable damage claims will be 
made available to Plaintiffs in Hills I. 
Plaintiffs argue the delay created by UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts diminished the value 
of the their claim in Hills L Plaintiffs fail to present any case or statutory law that "mere delay 
without other injury is actionable" for intentional spoliation of evidence. If there was a showing 
that Plaintiffs' claims against Skyline were barred by the statute of limitations or Skyline's 
insurer was insolvent, then there may be actionable injury. However, Plaintiffs fail to show that 
there is anything more than mere delay.7 Plaintiffs are not prevented from recovering the full 
extent of their damages that they can prove in Hills I. 
Although Skyline is a first party to the underlying suit relating to Mr. Hills wrongful 
death, Hills /, the same reasoning that applies to UPS and Liberty Mutual applies to Skyline with 
regard to the intentional spoliation of evidence claim and the remaining damages. Whatever 
damages Plaintiffs are entitled to from Skyline will be determined in Hills L Plaintiffs should 
not have a second bite of the apple against Skyline in continuing Hills //where the issue of 
damages will be conclusively decided between them in Hills L 
Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are claimed here against all of Defendants whereas 
Hills I captures only one defendant, Skyline. Plaintiffs argue that all Defendants should be 
7
 See supra n.2. 0 0 1 2 3 4 
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subject to punitive damages for their actions. Although the Court understands that there are more 
parties and deeper pockets with three Defendants in the case at bar, rather than just one in Hills /, 
Plaintiffs' desire for punitive damages is an inadequate basis to allow punitive damages to stand 
alone. There must be a viable cause of action attached to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim. As 
decided above, Plaintiffs intentional spoliation claim fails, thus there is no meritorious cause of 
action to justify a punitive damage award. 
Plaintiffs argue that if punitive damages are not allowed as a remedy for Defendants 
actions they will escape punishment and there is nothing to deter such action in the future. What 
was done by Defendants in altering or destroying evidence is not condoned by this Court. The 
law specifically provides sanctions where such actions occur. There was a punishment for UPS' 
actions, a fine was imposed by Utah Occupational Safety and Health ("UOSH"), which is the 
state entity that investigates accidents at work sites. UOSH has investigated both the death and 
subsequent actions of UPS. As a result of their investigation, UOSH imposed a fine against 
UPS, the amount of which is beyond this Court's purview. Although Plaintiffs would like a 
private right of action to be created with UPS' duty to preserve an accident work site for UOSH 
and a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs fail to cite a legal basis to do so. 
There are other sanctions in place to prevent tampering with evidence. If a company or 
employee choose to tamper with evidence, they are subject to criminal charges and 
administrative penalties. Individuals that destroy evidence are subject to criminal charges for 
Tampering with Evidence in Noncriminal Official Proceedings, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510.5., a 
class A misdemeanor, and if committed in an official proceeding, a third degree felony. If an 
employee of UPS, Liberty Mutual or Skyline knowingly or intentionally altered, destroyed, 
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concealed or removed anything with the purpose of impairing the veracity or viability of the 
thing in a proceeding or investigation that the person knew was pending or about to be instituted 
or with the intent to prevent an investigation or proceeding, then the person can be prosecuted. 
For a third degree felony conviction, the penalty could include imprisonment in a state prison for 
a term not to exceed five years and a fine not to exceed $5,000 plus an 85% surcharge. For a 
class A misdemeanor conviction, the penalty could include imprisonment in jail for a term not to 
exceed one year and a fine not to exceed $2,500 plus an 85% surcharge. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
3-203,-204,-301. 
UPS, Liberty Mutual and/or Skyline could also be held criminally responsible for the 
actions of an employee that tampered with evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-204. 
The fines for a felony conviction against one of them shall not exceed $20,000 plus an 85% 
surcharge and for a class A misdemeanor conviction shall not exceed $10,000 plus an 85% 
surcharge. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-302. Additional sanctions could include advertising of 
conviction and/or disqualification of officer(s). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that with Skyline's admission to liability 
in Hills /, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court 
GRANTS the Renewed Motion to Dismiss the second and third causes of action and the 
remaining damages claims in favor of UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline. 
***** Intentionally left blank ***** 
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II 
ALTERNATIVE BASIS TO DISMISS UPS 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
UPS alleges that Plaintiffs' admission that their Hills //negligence claim against UPS is 
barred by the Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101 etseq, (the Act) 
is fatal to Plaintiffs' remaining claims of intentional misconduct and tortious interference because 
the type of act necessary to overcome the Act's exclusivity provisions are not present. Plaintiffs 
respond that the Act's exclusive remedy does not bar Plaintiffs' claims of intentional misconduct 
and tortuous interference because this case implicates the dual capacity doctrine. Plaintiffs argue 
that the Act only bars suit against employers for injuries arising out of the course of employment. 
They argue that their injuries relative to these causes of action arose solely out of acts or 
omissions that took place after their son's death - matters distinct from on the job injury. 
Plaintiffs argue that after Mr. Hills died, UPS could not be acting in its capacity as Mr. Hills 
employer. Plaintiffs further argue that UPS was acting outside the scope of its employer-
employee relationship with Mark Hills when UPS intentionally altered evidence, lost or 
destroyed evidence and UPS employees lied to Utah OSHA investigators, and UPS generally 
engaged in a cover up of the cause of Mark Hills' death. 
The Worker's Compensation Act "makes it clear that the intent of the legislature is to 
provide an exclusive remedy for job related injuries." Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d at 899. 
"The dual capacity doctrine directly conflicts with the exclusive remedy provision of [the Act]." 
Id. The dual capacity doctrine is an exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act that 
has not been adopted in Utah, but the doctrine's existence has been acknowledged in three Utah 
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cases, Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1985), Stewart v. CMI 
Corporation, 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987); and Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 
1993). "Under this doctrine, an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive 
remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his 
capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on his obligations independent of those 
imposed on him as an employer." Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d at 680. 
The decisive test to determine if the dual capacity doctrine is invokable is not 
whether the second function or capacity of the employer is different and separate 
from the first. Rather, the test is whether the employer's conduct in the second 
role or capacity has generated obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from 
the company's or individual's first role as an employer. If the obligations are 
related, the doctrine is not applicable. Id. 
UPS' conduct that is the basis of Plaintiffs "intentional misconduct" and "tortuous 
interference" causes of action relate to UPS' activities after Mr. Hills death. These activities 
include: conducting their own investigation of the accident site prior to notifying OSHA or law 
enforcement; contacting and working in concert with the co-defendants; removal, alteration of 
equipment, material, or other evidence; failure to disclose, misrepresent and/or conceal their 
actions to OSHA, and other like allegations. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, UPS' conduct in its role with OSHA and the co-defendants did not generate obligations 
that are unrelated to UPS' obligations flowing from its first role as an employer. Therefore, even 
assuming the Utah Supreme Court would adopt the dual capacity doctrine, the Court concludes 
that in this case, the dual capacity doctrine cannot be invoked to overcome the exclusive remedy 
shield of the Act as it applies to UPS. As an alternative basis to dismiss UPS, the Courl 
concludes that the exclusive remedy provision of the Act shields UPS from liability. 
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ORDER 
The Court hereby ORDERS: 
UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss GRANTED on the second and third causes of action and 
the damages claims asserted in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1), therefore, UPS, Liberty Mutual and 
Skyline are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 
DATED this J _ day of September, 2008. - - * « ^ 
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